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I. INTRODUCTION
The propriety and desirability of judges attempting to settle cases assigned to
them for trial is a subject of debate. Historically, scholars framed the debate in
terms of judges conducting "settlement conferences" for cases assigned to them
for trial. This article shares empirical data from a survey of all California judges
in 2004 regarding their attitudes of approval or disapproval of judges conducting
settlement conferences for cases assigned to them for trial. More importantly, it
documents the extent to which those judges engage in the practice, differentiating
the extent of the practice between judges with family law, general civil, limited
civil, and complex civil assignments.
A contemporary wrinkle in the historic debate concerns judges conducting
"mediations" of cases assigned to them for trial. There have been notable suc-
cesses in some California jurisdictions with sitting judges serving as mediators,
attracting the attention of legal commentators debating the issue. This article
documents the extent to which judges conceptually approve of this practice and
the extent they engage in it.
The phenomenon of judges mediating cases assigned to them for trial is ex-
amined from the perspective of judicial codes of ethics, which in current form
permit the practice. This article considers both proposed revisions to such codes,
and those in current force and effect. The confusion in the law created by the
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advent of judicial mediation is illustrated by examining California statutory and
case law on confidentiality and standards of practice, which differ depending on
whether the process is labeled a "settlement conference" or "mediation." Califor-
nia law relies heavily on the label of the process to determine the rights and re-
sponsibilities thereof. This article questions the "label of the process" methodol-
ogy by documenting a strong degree of similarity in the content of the two proc-
esses as practiced by judges in California.
The article then explores the ramifications of the Uniform Mediation Act's
express inapplicability of its confidentiality provisions to a mediation "conducted
by a judge who might make a ruling on the case."' Finally, the article suggests
how the advent of judicial mediation might lead to standards of practice that
would clarify the law and resolve the debate about judges conducting either set-
tlement conferences or mediations for cases assigned to them for trial.
II. THERE IS A DEBATE ABOUT JUDGES ATTEMPTING TO SETTLE CASES
ASSIGNED TO THEM FOR TRIAL
A. Legal Commentators are Conflicted
Professor Marc Galanter documented the evolution in judicial attitude and
practice regarding involvement in settlement from the late 1800s to 1986.2 By the
1920s, early initiatives for "conciliation courts," where judges would encourage
reconciliation, were affected by some judges' observations of opportunities for
greater efficiency in judicial administration.3
Galanter documented "a considerable difference of opinion" among judges
regarding whether settlement was the chief purpose of the Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure (FRCP) 16 pretrial conference or whether settlement was a merely a
byproduct.4 The Judicial Conference of the United States resolved the matter by
adopting the "byproduct" view in 1944 that, with notable pockets of contrary
practice, prevailed for about a decade.
5
1. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 3(b)(3) (2001).
2. Marc Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 256
(1986). For a brief history of settlement conferences, see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and
Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485,
490 (1985). Professor Galanter's documentation of the evolution of judicial practice is nicely com-
plemented by Professor Judith Resnik's article on, among other things, "how and why federal judges
came to reorient the processes of judging and, in essence, to redefine their jobs by adding the manage-
ment and settlement of civil cases to their judicial role." Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as
Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article 111, 113 HARv. L. REv. 924, 929 (2000). Professor Res-
nik describes the background conditions and organizational development that enabled this transforma-
tion: she cites the importance of rulemaking in the 1930s, protracted litigation in the 1950s, schools for
judges in the following decades, judges who were committed advocates for the changes, and "official
mandates for federal judges and in conceptions of the judicial role" as well as the creation of an "insti-
tutional voice" for the federal judiciary. Id. at 948.
3. Galanter, supra note 2, at 258.
4. Id. at 259. See also Michael Hogan, Judicial Settlement Conferences: Empowering the Parties
to Decide Through Negotiation, 27 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 429 (1991). Hogan concludes that "from
1938 to 1983, settlement was generally considered to be only a by-product of a good pretrial procedure
rather than a primary objective." Id. at 431.
5. Galanter, supra note 2, at 259-60.
No. 2]
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Galanter quotes three federal judges' ardent endorsement of settlement efforts
in the early 1960's, and documents that by the 1970's federal judges had em-
braced the role of mediator because settlement was perceived as producing a supe-
6rior quality of justice. Galanter describes the 1983 amendment to FRCP 16,
specifying the possibility of settlement as one of the appropriate topics at a pre-
trial conference, as formal ratification of what had become the "unmistakably...
'established' position in the federal judiciary., 7
Professor Judith Resnik's 1982 article articulating concerns about managerial
judging8 became a reference point for much of the subsequent scholarship about
the role of judges in settlement.9 She claimed that managerial judging, which
includes judges conducting settlement conferences for their own cases, results in a
reduction of distance between parties and the judge, a distance necessary to main-
tain the image of judge as dispassionate agent of justice.'0 She argued that it is
especially problematic if a judge considered matters not admissible at trial be-
cause of the shielding from review enjoyed by pretrial procedures." Resnik also
argued that a "blurring [of] roles," motivated by too high a volume of cases,
would cause acceptance of the view that "less judging and more settling" is gener-
ally appropriate.
12
Professor Leroy Tornquist reviewed the pros and cons of judges being in-
volved in settlement and recommended reforms including, "The judge who is to
try the case on the merits should be barred from participating in settlement nego-
tiations." 13
Michael R. Hogan, a United States Magistrate Judge at the time, rebutted the
criticisms of judges attempting to settle cases. 14 He countered the concern about
accomplishing justice by referencing a study finding that participants in mediation
were much more likely to perceive the outcome as fair than participants in adjudi-
cation. 15 The concern about settlement judges sacrificing the quality or justness of
a resolution on the alter of efficiency and docket management he countered with,
among other things, the commitment to assuring fairness in the judges' oath of
office, and with FRCP 1 (requiring a judge mediator to consider the "justness" of
6. Id. at 261.
7. Id. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow's statement in 1985 that "My own view is that [judicial
involvement in] settlement is now the norm." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 513.
8. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376 (1982).
9. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 513.
10. See Resnik, supra note 8, at 383; see also Menkel-Meadow, supra, note 2, at 407.
11. Resnik, supra note 8, at 408.
12. Resnik, supra note 2, at 992-93.
13. Leroy Tomquist, The Active Judge in Pretrial Settlement: Inherent Authority Gone Awry, 25
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 743, 773 (1989). In his opinion, "this conclusion is true whether or not there is a
jury trial." Id. at 773 n.141.
14. Hogan, supra note 4.
15. Id. at 436, (citing Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine:
An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 245 (1981)); see also Marc Galanter and Mia Cahill,
Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1354
(1994). But see E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEFrION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF
TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 33-37, 44-47
(1989) (survey results of 286 personal injury tort litigants finding higher satisfaction with the outcome
and perceived greater fairness in the process when cases were resolved by trial or arbitration as op-
posed to judicial settlement conferences).
[Vol. 2006
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settlement).16 He addressed the concern about the lack of empirical documenta-
tion, showing that judicial settlement conferences create more or earlier settle-
ments, by arguing that experienced judges are in the best position to determine on
a case by case basis the amount of effort that should be invested in judicially su-
pervised settlement conferences.'
7
Hogan also addressed the concerns about settlement judges presiding at sub-
sequent trials. 18 First, he claimed that this concern "implies a misunderstanding of
what the judge's role in the negotiation process should be." 19 He suggested that it
is the rare judge who becomes "such a partisan advocate of a certain settlement"
and tries to impose "sanctions for a party's failure to adopt the court's settlement
figure.,, 20 In contrast, he suggested that "judges who understand and use success-
ful intervention tactics in the negotiation process would (not) blame one particular
party for a case not settling. '21 He stated that the desire to insulate judges from
knowledge about cases before trial fails to acknowledge that "[j]udges frequently
are called upon to compartmentalize their thoughts by separate rulings without
defending claims of partiality.,
22
While making the case that the focus of settlement conferences should be bet-
ter quality solutions rather than judicial efficiency, Professor Carrie Menkel-
Meadow observed both sides of the debate: The settlement conference should not
be managed by the trial judge "so that the interests and considerations that might
effect a settlement but would be inadmissible in court will not prejudice a later
,23trial." Although, "some of the settlement authority of the third party may be
directly related to the judge's power, control, or knowledge of the specific case
and the value of the conference may be diminished if another person is used." 24
Professor E. Donald Elliott argued that using managerial judicial powers to
accomplish settlement under some circumstances will accomplish more just reso-
lutions.25 In his discourse he observed:
Managerial judging is evolving rapidly from a set of techniques for nar-
rowing issues to a set of techniques for settling cases. . . . On the other
hand, other judges, including some staunch advocates of managerial
judging oppose the use of managerial powers to encourage (or, some
would say, to coerce) settlement .... Once managerial judging became
established, it was inevitable that some judges would begin using their
discretionary power to impose procedural costs on particular litigants to
16. Hogan, supra note 4, at 437.
17. Id. at 440.
18. Id. But he includes in his defense of this practice an assumption that "if the parties and attorneys
request that an unsuccessfully negotiated case be assigned to another judge for trial, it is difficult to
imagine that it would not be assigned. To insist on trying the case only to have a party object after-
wards, based on a claim of partiality, would be a waste of time and money and would create more
litigation." Id. at 439. This assumption may not always be the case.
19. Id. at 439.
20. Id. at 439.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 511.
24. Id. at 512.
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stimulate settlements that they considered to be in the interest of justice.
However, these uses of the managerial powers of judges and masters to
promote settlements are controversial and it is important to understand
why. Ultimately, procedure and substance cannot be divorced: no proce-
dural decision can be completely 'neutral' in the sense that it does not af-
fect substance. Increasing litigation costs does not merely increase the
likelihood of settlement; it inevitably alters the amount that a rational
party would be willing to pay to settle, and hence is likely to alter the
terms of the settlement as well.26
He illustrated his argument by noting that "if there is a pronounced difference
in the economic resources available to the parties of the lawsuit, a judge might
very well promote a more just solution by restricting the ability of the wealthier
parties to use their economic resources to tactical advantage.,
27
Professors Menkel-Meadow and Elliot, as well as Hogan, have defended
managerial judges using their powers to advance settlement based on judges using
those powers "to stimulate settlements that the [judges] consider to be in the inter-
est of justice. ' 28 Moreover, such use of judicial power is defensible because set-
tlement offers "a substantive justice that may be more responsive to the parties'
needs than adjudication." 29 These advantageous opportunities of settling judges
must be weighed in light of some of the dangers of abuse.
Professor Peter H. Schuck's analysis of Chief Judge Jack B. Weinstein's or-
chestration of settlement of the Agent Orange class action case offers observations
of how judges assist settlement, as well as the concurrent dangers of doing so. 30
Explaining the advantages of having judges involved in settlement, he stated:
In fact, a judge controls four distinct kinds of resources that may facili-
tate or even be indispensable to settlement, especially in complex cases.
Typically, these resources are inaccessible to lawyers except insofar as
the judge decides to make them available. They include control over the
disposition of certain issues; knowledge about other factors relevant to
settlement of the case; the judge's reputation for fairness; and control
over certain inducements and administrative supports.
31
Despite these advantages, he stated:
The analysis also suggests, however, that there are risks to justice, and to
the appearance of justice when judges--especially those who are in a po-
sition to rule on the merits and thus control the outcome of a case-
actively involve themselves in settlement. These risks exist even when
settlement is thought to be a good thing, either in general or in a particu-
26. Id. at 324-25 (citations omitted).
27. Id. at 325-26.
28. Id. at 325.
29. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 504.
30. Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53
U. Cm. L. REv. 337 (1986).
31. Id. at 350.
[Vol. 2006
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lar case. Even if the risks of judicial involvement are outweighed by the
advantages, as I think they were in the Agent Orange case, they merit
profound concern. These risks seem to me to be of three main types: ju-
dicial overreaching, judicial over-commitment, and procedural unfair-
ness.
32
He explained judicial overreaching by stating, "even if judges scrupulously
avoid rewarding or punishing lawyers who do or do not cooperate in effecting
settlement, the danger remains that lawyers will interpret judicial involvement as
thinly-veiled coercion ... He encouraged a sensitivity to this concern because
there is little consensus on what constitutes judicial impropriety; settlement dis-
cussions are often highly emotional and interpretation is subject to perception, and
there is no objective transcript of what was said and done.34
He explained judicial over-commitment with the statement,
[A] judge who makes such an investment [in helping to fashion a settle-
ment] is unlikely to remain indifferent as to the outcome of the negotia-
tions. The risk is that the judge's commitment may become excessive,
compromising the appearance or reality of the judge's fairness as to
whether the case will be litigated or settle, and possibly even with regard
to the merits.35
He went on to explain that this is especially troubling in cases, such as the Agent
Orange case, that require the judge to confirm the settlement as fair, reasonable,
and adequate.36
He explained that the informal and secretive nature of settlement conferences
threaten common aspects of procedural fairness such as accuracy, individual dig-
nity, participation, and openness of decision making. 37 Especially when the judge
meets privately with both sides, due process is wanting because parties may not be
aware of accusations or interpretations presented outside their presence, and thus
may not know of the need to rehabilitate or rebut.
38
Professor Schuck concluded with the recommendation that trial judges be
barred from participating in settlement negotiations.
39
B. Active Judges Are Conflicted
In addition to legal academic debate, this issue is a source of controversy
among the sitting bench. The debate surfaced anecdotally, and regularly, when
this author led more than eight groups of about twenty-five California judges,
each in mediation skills training programs over five years. California's Adminis-
32. Id. at 359.
33. Id. at 359-60.
34. Id. at 360.
35. Id. at 361.
36. Id. at 362.
37. Id. at 362-65.
38. Id. at 362.
39. Id. at 364-65.
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trative Office of the Courts (AOC) was unequivocally supportive when the author
became interested in documenting judicial attitudes and practices about settlement
conferences and/or mediation. The data might assist academics and policy makers
wrestling with an array of questions related to judges attempting to settle cases
assigned to them for trial. It might also be of interest to those judges, who at
times feel isolated and are curious about judicial norms.
1. Methodology for Surveying California Judges
California's AOC allowed the author to survey each of California's 1800
bench officers40 regarding judges attempting to settle civil or family law cases.
The data developed from this survey is suspect in that the judges were self report-
ing and thus prone to view and interpret themselves in the best possible light.4'
The AOC42 participated in developing the survey, 43 which asks judges about their
views regardinA judges assisting in settling cases as well as their practices in the
last four years.
The surveys were mailed out in an AOC envelope with other AOC corre-
spondence.45 The responses were returned to a Post Office Box in Winnetka,
California, a little-known community in the San Fernando Valley, as part of a
comprehensive commitment to ensure that participants not know that a professor
from the Straus Institute at Pepperdine University in Malibu, California, was the
AOC's collaborator for this project. 46
Three-hundred and sixty-eight out of 1,800 bench officers responded. While
this was a little disappointing, it was not completely surprising because the survey
was extensive, requiring about fifteen minutes to complete, and judges are notori-
ous for not completing surveys. One weakness of the following analysis and con-
clusions is that they are based on a limited response. The 368 who responded
40. This number includes all appellate judges and commissioners, as well as elected and appointed
trial judges.
41. "[P]eople's assessments of their own abilities to meet various challenges exceed the best dispas-
sionate analyses of those abilities." Thomas Gilovich et al., Shallow Thoughts About the Self: The
Automatic Components of Self-Assessment, in THE SELF IN SOCIAL JuDGMENT 67 (Mark D. Alicke,
David A. Dunning, Joachim 1. Krueger eds., Psychology Press 2005). "[Pleople's assessments of their
own traits and abilities have been shown, time and time again, to be overly optimistic." Id.
42. Special appreciation is expressed to AOC staff attorneys Kareen Alvarado, Heather Anderson,
and Alan Wiener, and Judge E. Jeffrey Burke.
43. See infra app. A.
44. The instructions stated that participation was completely voluntary and that respondents were
free to not answer any question for any reason. The judges were told that participating would assist in
documenting judicial norms and they could receive a composite summary of the responses by returning
a separate postage paid postcard, even if they chose to not complete the survey.
45. The judges were informed of the AOC's partnership with a law school professor on this research
project to insure the anonymity of their responses. The judges knew that even the law school professor
would not know which judges responded and only the aggregate compilations of the data would be
provided to the AOC.
46. The concern was that the responses from the approximately 200 judges who had completed the
Straus training program might be positively biased because they appeared to appreciate the training
and like the faculty. Pepperdine and Malibu were not identified in any way in the cover letter, return
address envelope and post card or the questionnaire, until the last question which lists various training
programs including JAMS, AAA, community mediation organizations, and Pepperdine.
(Vol. 2006
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stated that in the last four years, they had the most experience in conducting set-
tlement conferences or mediations in the following areas:
Responding Jud es by Assignment
General Civil4 ' 129 respondents
Family Law 48  72 respondents
Limited Jurisdiction Civil49  22 respondents
Complex Civil"0  6 respondents"'
Marked more than one of the above 10 respondents
Did not conduct mediations or settle-
ment conferences in any of the above
types of cases in the last four years 85 respondents
52
Did not respond to this question 44 respondents
Table 1
2. Judges' Attitudes Toward Settlement Conferences
One of the first questions in the survey asked judges about the extent to which
they agree or disagree53 with the statement: "With the consent of the parties, I
believe that civil or family law judges should be allowed to conduct settlement
conferences for cases assigned to them for trial." The judges' reactions to this
statement are summarized below in Table 2.
47. The California Rules of Court define "General Civil Case" as "all civil cases except probate,
guardianship, conservatorship, family law (including proceedings under the Family Law Act, Uniform
Parentage Act, and Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act; freedom from parental custody and con-
trol proceedings; and adoption proceedings), juvenile court proceedings, small claims proceedings,
unlawful detainer proceedings, and "other civil petitions" as defined by the Judicial Branch Statistical
Information Data Collection Standards." CAL. CT. R. 200.1.
48. Family law embodies "all family law matters like divorce, child custody, child support, and
domestic violence." STATE OF CALIFORNIA, GUIDE TO COURTS 2 (2000), available at
http://www.occourts.org/hometbrochures/family en.pdf; Black's Law Dictionary defines family law as
"[t]he body of law dealing with marriage, divorce, adoption, child custody and support, child abuse
and neglect, paternity, juvenile delinquency, and other domestic-relations issues." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 638 (8th ed. 2006).
49. In this context, limited jurisdiction means that a court has [pecuniary] restrictions on the cases it
can decide. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 869 (8th ed. 2006). E.g., small claims is a court of lim-
ited jurisdiction, because it can only hear cases that claim damages of $5,000 or less. In 2004, Califor-
nia's Limited Jurisdiction Courts handled cases that claimed damages up to $25,000. CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 86 (West 2006).
50. Complex civil cases are "cases that require exceptional judicial management to avoid placing
unnecessary burdens on the court or the litigants", and "may involve such areas as antitrust, securities
claims, construction defects, toxic torts, mass torts, and class actions." CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE COURTS, COMPLEX CIviL LITIGATION FACT SHEET 1 (2006), available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/comit.pdf.
51. While this number is small, there are only 18 Complex Civil Judges in the entire state of Cali-
fornia.
52. The assumption is that the 85 respondents who had not conducted mediations or settlement
conferences in any of the above categories had appellate or criminal law assignments.
53. Specifically, in response to a particular statement, the judges were asked to indicate "Strongly
Disagree," "Disagree," "No Opinion," "Agree," or "Strongly Agree."
No. 2]
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DID NOT ANSWER 34
Table 2
Comparing the combined "Strongly Agree" and "Agree" categories with the
combined "Strongly Disagree" and "Disagree" categories reveals a 267 to 60
(82% of those with an opinion) acceptance of judges conducting settlement con-
ferences for their own cases. Among the interesting aspects of this data is the
similarity to data reported 24 years earlier.54 While documenting that a superma-
jority of judges support the proposition in concept, it is important to note that
nearly one-fifth of the judges do not agree. The ratio was fairly consistent across
the spectrum of judicial assignments. 55 The conflict among sizable segments of
sitting judges reveals that the debate is not merely academic.
In order to gauge the impact of this conflict among judges, the survey went on
to assess the frequency and prevalence of judicial settlement conferences. The
difference in beliefs on this issue could be minimized or magnified depending on
the number of settlement conferences judges conduct.
The demographics of the respondents evolves because the survey instructed
judges who had not had a family or civil assignment in the last four years to an-
swer questions about their beliefs regarding judges conducting settlement confer-
ences and mediations, and then to not answer additional questions. Thus the focus
of the survey was to quantify judicial attitudes of all judges, but only the practices
of current civil and family law judges. "Current" was defined as having con-
ducted a settlement conference or mediation within the last four years. Eighty-
five judges without civil or family law assignments revealed their attitudes toward
judicial settlement conferences and mediations, and then followed the instructions
to not answer any further questions. The demographics for the judges who com-
pleted the rest of the survey are as follows: 72 family law judges, 129 general civil
54. See Marc Galanter, "A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge:" Judicial Mediation in the United
States, 12 J.L. & Soc'Y. 1, 7 n.41 (1985) (citing JOHN PAUL RYAN ET AL., AMERICAN TRI JUDGES:
THEIR WORK STYLES AND PERFORMANCE 170 (1980) (stating survey results which show that over 75
percent of judges as intervening in settlement discussion compared to almost 22 percent as non-
intervening)).
55. Settlement Conferences Should Be Allowed: By Response Strength and Assignment
Number of Responses (FREQ)
Family Law General Civil Limited Jurisdiction Complex Civil
Strongly Disagree 5 9 1 0
Disagree 7 12 1 1
No Opinion 1 1 0 0
Agree 18 28 5 1
Strongly Agree 38 71 14 4




Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2006, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2006/iss2/1
Adding Judicial Mediation to the Debate
judges, 22 limited jurisdiction judges, 6 complex civil judges, and 10 judges who
reported having assignments in more than one category. The judges with assign-
ments in more than one category were not counted in any of the designated cate-
gories, but were included in the category of all judges, when used.
3. Frequency of Judicial Settlement Conferences
The survey asked, "The number of settlement meetings I conduct a week is
about __ ." Separate answers were requested for settlement conferences and
mediations, if any. The responses, by the judges' assignments, for settlement
conferences are summarized below in Table 4.
Number of Settlement Conferences per Week:
By Percentage of Re sondents
Number Family Law General Civil Limited Juris. Complex Civil
0 1.9%(2)
4-1 20.3% (12) 41.3% (43) 30% (6) 60% (3)
2-5 50.8% (42) 46 % (48) 65% (13) 40% (2)
6-9 6.7%(4) 5.7%(6)
10-15 15 % (9) 3.7% (4) 5% (1)
16 - 27 6.7% (4) 0.9% (1)
No Response (12) (25) (2) (1)
Table 4
First, it is interesting to note that only 2 judges stated that they do not conduct
settlement conferences. A sizable number of judges did not answer, which could
be interpreted a variety of ways.56 The discussion above noted that a sizable mi-
nority of judges disapprove of judges conducting settlement conferences for cases
assigned to them for trial. Nevertheless, those judges conduct settlement proceed-
ings, presumably for cases not assigned to them for trial.
While this data establishes that almost all judges conduct settlement confer-
ences, the mode57 response for every judicial assignment except complex civil is
the range of 2 to 5; that is, the most common judicial practice is to conduct be-
tween two and five settlement conferences per week. The practice of conducting
between one-fourth and one settlement conference per week is significant, repre-
senting the practice of 20% of family law judges and 40% of general civil judges.
Conducting more than five per week is fairly rare, with the exception of a signifi-
56. For example there were 69 family law judges who answered the question about their beliefs
regarding whether judges should be allowed to conduct settlement conferences for cases assigned to
them for trial, compared to 62 family law judges who answered this question and the 12 who chose not
to answer this question. Likewise for general civil judges, 121 answered the question about their
beliefs, but only 98 answered this question with 25 choosing not to answer. Despite the availability of
being able to indicate zero per week, some of the judges may have chosen not to answer this question
because they do not conduct any settlement conferences.
57. In statistics, mode is defined as "[tihe value or item occurring most frequently in a series of
observations or statistical data." AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1160 (3d ed. 1992).
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cant cluster (15%) of family law judges who conduct between ten and fifteen per
week.58
4. Percentage of Settlement Meetings Where the Settlement Judge Was
Also the Trial Judge
The questionnaire asked the judge to fill in a blank for the question, "The per-
centage of my settlement meetings that are for cases in which I am assigned as the
trial judge is about: _ ." Separate answers were requested for settlement confer-
ences and mediations, if any.
The responses, by judicial assignment, for settlement conferences are summa-
rized in Table 5.
Grouped Percentages of Judges Responding
Percentage Family Law General Civil Limited Juris. Complex Civil
0 7.3% (5) 29.6% (35) 15.7% (3) 33.3% (2)
1-10 4.4% (3) 10.1% (12) 5.2% (1) 16.6% (1)
11-40 2.9%(2) 6.7%(8) 5.2%(1)
41-89 13.2% (9) 15.2% (18) 16.6% (1)
90-99 14.7% (10) 20.3% (24) 5.2% (1)
100 57.3% (39) 17.8% (21) 68.4% (13) 33.3% (2)
Table 5
This question is the core of the debate.
The responses to the first question in the survey revealed that 82% of the
judges believed that it was appropriate to conduct settlement conferences for cases
in which they were assigned as the trial judge.59 This data confirms to what extent
they engage in the practice.
The data also confirms the split in the judiciary about this practice. The gen-
eral civil bench is most polarized with 17.8% of judges reporting that all their
settlement conferences are for cases assigned to them for trial and 29.6% respond-
ing that they never conduct settlement conferences for cases assigned to them for
trial. The comparison of combined "0-10%" and "90-100%" responses for gen-
eral civil judges reveal an almost evenly balanced, polarized judiciary: 38.1% of
judges report that they are the trial judge for 90% or more of the settlement con-
ferences they conduct, compared to 39.7% of judges who report that they are the
trial judge for 10% or less of the settlement conferences they conduct.
58. Another question in the survey documented that the average number of new cases per year for
family law judges was about 1300 compared to about 450 for general civil judges. The greater fre-
quency of settlement conferences may reflect the need to manage a greater caseload. This theory is not
confirmed by the volume of cases assigned per year for limited jurisdiction civil judges, an average of
nearly 1300, whose frequency for settlement conferences is more similar to judges with a general civil
assignment. Interpreting the variances in the number of settlement conferences per week for the dif-
ferent judicial assignments requires a detailed examination of the differences in types of cases between
the judicial assignments. For example, there are no jury trials in family law and some of the limited
jurisdiction judges may handle small claims cases in which parties are prohibited from being repre-
sented.
59. See supra Part ll.B.ii.
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It is especially interesting to contrast the frequency of the practice between
family law judges and general civil judges. Of family law judges, 54.9% re-
sponded that all their settlement conferences are for cases assigned to them for
trial, compared to only 17.8% of general civil judges. Combining the 90-99%
category with the 100% category captures 72% of family law judges, but only
38.1% of general civil judges. While there are variations, the middle categories
are roughly similar. Only 7.3% of family law judges decline to engage in the
practice, compared to 29.5% of general civil judges. This indicates the existence
of a highly polarized general civil bench, to be contrasted with a much more gen-
erally accepting family law bench. 60 Note that the profile for limited jurisdiction
judges is similar to that of family law judges, and that the profile for the complex
civil judges is similar to the general civil judges.
III. How DOES THE ADVENT OF "JUDICIAL MEDIATION" AFFECT THIS
DEBATE?
A. San Luis Obispo County As an Example of the Advent of Judicial Me-
diation
The impact and momentum of judges embracing the concept of mediating
cases assigned to them for trial is illustrated by the experiences of the Honorable
E. Jeffrey Burke and the courts where he sits in San Luis Obispo County, Califor-
nia.6 1 The journey began in the fall of 1998 when Judge Burke attended a six day
workshop entitled, "Mediating the Litigated Case," presented by the Straus Insti-
tute for Dispute Resolution at Pepperdine University School of Law.
62
Judge Burke was about to begin an assignment as the supervising civil judge
for the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court. He only recently had been ap-
pointed to the Superior Court63 and faced a daunting backlog of civil cases.
64
Judge Burke was unfamiliar with mediation and thought it might be helpful to
learn whether mediation could be employed to help manage the backlog.
65
San Luis Obispo County has a population of roughly 300,000 and is a re-
gional commercial hub for the largely agricultural central California coast. In
1999, the San Luis Obispo County Superior Court had thirteen judicial officers
60. This is an important area for further investigation because it suggests that despite the greater
concern about compromising the adjudicatory process (because family law trials are always bench
trials), family law judges might be more accepting of conducting settlement conferences for their own
cases because it is necessary to manage the docket. See supra note 58 (discussing the greater volume
of caseload for family law judges).
61. This incidence of documented enhanced court productivity or efficiency should be considered in
the context of Professors Galanter's and Cahill's conclusion, after examining the research regarding
court efficiency as a reason for judges to invest in settlement, that, "in conjunction with judges who are
skilled and motivated mediators and supportive attorneys, a well designed program of judicial promo-
tion of settlement may sometimes produce court savings. But there is no reason to think that in the
ordinary mix of circumstances judicial settlement efforts produce significant payoffs in terms of court
savings." Galanter & Cahill, supra note 15, at 1369.
62. Personal Statement of Judge E. Jeffrey Burke, Superior Court Judge in San Luis Obispo (on file
with author) 7.
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assigned to four divisions: seven judges handled criminal cases and juvenile court
matters; three judges handled civil cases, probate matters, and the court's appel-
late division; two judges handed family law matters; and one judge dealt with
traffic and small claims.
66
Before 1999, civil cases in San Luis Obispo County were managed in a Mas-
ter Calendar system. In such a system the supervising civil judge is responsible
for all of the civil cases in the courthouse, assigning hearings and trials to whoever
on the civil team is available. 67 Judge Burke attended the Mediating the Litigated
Case program because he had been informed that San Luis Obispo ranked thirty-
fifth out of California's fifty-eight counties in its compliance with statewide case
management standards for civil cases.
68
In early 1999 there were 276 cases set for trial, and nearly every one of them
had been called for trial before but had to be reset because there was no judge
available to conduct the trial. Many of the 276 cases had been in the system for
more than two years and the typical case that was actually tried was over three
70years old.69 Only 53% of new civil filings were disposed of within one year,
compared to California's statewide "Fast Track" standards of 90%. 7 1 The cases
that resolved within one year were matters the parties took care of on their own;
judges were simply too busy dealing with the backlog to give much attention to
settlement.72
Judge Burke's tenure as supervising civil judge began on April 1, 1999. In
anticipation of his first week, Judge Burke realized that seven cases were set for
jury trial, but only one department would be available.73 The other civil judges
were engaged in ongoing jury or court trials. 74 This progressively enlarging back-
log was not because judges were not trying cases. In the three months between
January 1, 1999 and March 31, 1999 there were 13 civil jury trials by five differ-
ent judges.75
Judge Burke, with the support of the other judges in his county, initiated two
significant changes to the administration of the civil docket in the spring of 1999.
Judge Burke replaced the Master Calendaring system in which a judge is assigned
76for all purposes, and initiated an aggressive civil mediation program.
The mediation program encourages, but does not require, litigants to attempt
to resolve cases by mediation. Litigants can hire private mediators or ask any one
of the judges to serve as the mediator.77 Cases could be reassigned to another






71. Under the California Rules of Court, each court shall have the goal to resolve 75% of all civil
cases classified as "unlimited" within one year. CAL. CT. R. § 2.1(f)(1) (2006) (resolution percentage
goal amended from 90% effective Jan. 1, 2004).




76. Id. 10, 13.
77. Id. 14. Mediation was an exception to the judge-for-all-purposes system in that the parties
could request any of the three civil judges to serve as their mediator. Id. If 14, 16.
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judge should preside over the trial.78 In the six years San Luis Obispo's mediation
program has been in place, no one has requested a reassignment.
79
The decision to make sitting judges available to serve as mediators was influ-
enced by Judge Burke's belief that mediation should be available through the
public courthouse. 80 Although California is the birthplace of Judicial Mediation
and Arbitration Services (JAMS), and despite wide acceptance of the practice of
utilizing retired judges as mediators since 1996, it is not a process that is available
to everyone. Judge Burke acknowledged the important service that retired judges
and private practice mediators provide to those who can afford it and recognized
the important advantages of this alternative dispute resolution option, but he could
not support a system that by reason of delays, abusive discovery, and high costs
pressures litigants out of the courthouse and into a process that is unaccountable to
anyone. 8 1 Burke thought that if the court was going to strongly encourage liti-
gants to mediate, then mediation should be available at no cost, and sitting judges
should make their singular accountability and strengths as mediators available for
that purpose.82
The seven cases set for trial the first week of April 1999 were calendared for
three- to four-hour mediations with Judge Burke during the preceding week. All
seven cases settled. Judge Burke then moved on to the cases set in the next week
calendaring each of them for a three-hour mediation. 83 As trials cleared, other
judges were able to schedule mediations, and the backlog in San Luis Obispo
began to disappear.
84
The adjustments to the civil calendar system in San Luis Obispo have been
well-received, and the sitting judges are widely accepted as mediators." The
judges' times were reallocated to conducting half-day mediations instead of con-
ducting trials. 86 The results were dramatic. By the end of 1999, only a handful of
cases set for trial were reset, and only about a dozen were more than two years
87old. By 2003, San Luis Obispo County was resolving 67% of new civil filings
within a year, compared to 53% in 1998, and ranked third out of California's fifty-
eight counties--compared to thirty-fifth in 1998-for statewide case processing
compliance.
88
In the beginning, Judge Burke, a former civil litigator from that county, was
the judge most often selected to serve as mediator. In the last nine months of
1999, Judge Burke mediated 91 cases with an 81% settlement rate. 89 The two
other civil judges combined to mediate only 2 more cases. 9° In 2000, the Con-






84. Id. 1 11.
85. Id. 1 17.
86. Id. 1 12. The 13 jury trials in the first three months of 1999 are contrasted with 7 court and 1
jury trials in the last nine months of 1999. On average, San Luis Obispo civil judges allocate about
one-third of their time to conduct meditations. Id.
87. Id. 12.
88. Id. U 5, 19,20.
89. Id. (H 18, 19.
90. Id. at add. 1.
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sumer Attorneys of California, the dominant statewide plaintiff trial lawyers asso-
ciation selected Judge Burke as the Trial Judge of the Year.
91
Any objective analysis of the Saint Louis Obispo experience must acknowl-
edge that in the beginning the program was dependent on Judge Burke's vision,
excellent relationship with the bar, and talent as a mediator.92 Judge Burke's in-
tention that this program would not be based on him personally has been estab-
lished by the statistics showing that, over time, the other judges increasingly were
selected and were successful as mediators.
93
A passing of the torch occurred in 2003 when Judge Burke accepted an as-
signment as Supervising Family Law Judge, where he continues to serve today.
In 2003, without Judge Burke, the civil judges in San Luis Obispo mediated 103
cases with a 58% settlement rate.94 The importance of mediation in managing
civil cases has not diminished; the civil team sets aside three days each week for
mediation, and the court requires any judicial officer who applies for a position on
the civil team to complete a week long mediation training program.
95
1. San Luis Obispo's Statewide Influence
Judge Burke shared San Luis Obispo's positive experience in judicial media-
tion with the staff and governing body of the Education Division of the Adminis-
trative Office of the Courts for California (AOC) and requested permission to
work with Pepperdine faculty to adapt its mediation workshop for presentation to
judicial officers. The program was approved for a one-time trial.96
The first course had three times as many applicants as could be accommo-
dated. The workshop has been offered twice a year between 2000 and 2002 and,
because of California's budget crisis, once a year from 2003 to the present. It is
one of the California Center for Judicial Education and Research's (CJER) most
popular offerings and has trained more than 300 California judges. 97 The program
has been retitled, "Mediation Skills for Judges," and the emphasis is on how indi-
vidual judges can use mediation skills to manage their dockets instead of starting a
county-wide program like Judge Burke.
91. It seems particularly ironic that he was recognized as an exceptional trial judge by trial lawyers
for essentially spending the vast majority of his time mediating.
92. The observation was first made to the author by another San Luis Obispo civil judge in January
2002. See also Personal Statement of Judge E. Jeffrey Burke, supra note 62, 18.
93. Id. at attachment 1, 2, 3, 4. Court statistics reveal that in 1999 Judge Burke conducted 91 out
of a total of 93 mediations conducted by the Court; in 2000 Burke conducted 167 out of 261 media-
tions; in 2001 Burke conducted 79 out of 152 mediations; and in 2002 Burke conducted 71 out of 191
mediations. By 2002, there were five judges conducting from 22 to 71 mediations each with settle-
ment rates ranging between 81 and 59%. Id.
94. Id. attachment 6.
95. Id. (H 21, 23.
96. Id. 26. At first the AOC was reluctant because the last time it had offered a short three-hour
course on mediation, only five persons expressed interest. The idea of offering a mediation program
lasting five days and having it feature professional faculty instead of CJER's practice of having only
judges teach other judges was met with skepticism. Members of the governing board, however, recog-
nized the increasing popularity of mediation and saw the advantage of having judges trained in media-




Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2006, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2006/iss2/1
Adding Judicial Mediation to the Debate
One of the questions for the author conducting these training programs was
whether the success of the San Luis Obispo experience was unique to Judge Burke
or the idyllic environment of San Luis Obispo-that is, whether the San Luis
Obispo experience could be replicated in other counties with different demograph-
ics, or whether this phenomenon was only possible with a relatively small bench
and bar. Some of the judges who completed the training program took the time to
anecdotally report to the author that after the course, they were increasingly en-
couraging mediation as well as serving as the mediator in cases assigned to them
for trial. They reported that this focus not only helped manage their dockets, but it
was also a source of great personal satisfaction. The judges reporting the positive
experience with mediation were from the full range of size of counties and
benches.98 Because many of them had cases assigned for all purposes, they could
implement a mediation emphasis for their calendar independent of a county-wide
initiative such as Judge Burke's.
Reports of the San Luis Obispo experience and the regular offering of the
Mediation Skills for Judges program encouraged the expansion of this practice. In
addition to individual judges managing their calendars differently, in 2003, the
Superior Court of Napa County, California, announced a judge-centered media-
tion program. Presiding Judge W. Scott Snowden stated, "Attorneys were coming
into court asking for an alternative dispute resolution process. Many were unsatis-
fied with expensive private mediators whose decisions were not final. So we de-
cided to cut through the red tape and give the litigants what they wanted directly
from our judges." 99
After the entire civil bench from Napa County attended Pepperdine's Mediat-
ing the Litigated Case, a mediation facility was opened in the courthouse and each
judge set aside at least one day a week to mediate cases.'l ° Judicial mediation
would only occur at the request of the parties. 10 1 Litigants can request mediation
from the judge assigned to the case or from another judge. 1° 2 Presiding Judge
Snowden is extremely enthusiastic about and committed to the project.'0 3
2. Delaware's Contrast to San Luis Obispo and Napa
In 2003, the author had an opportunity to meet with a committee of judges
from the state courts in Delaware commissioned with the revision of Delaware's
Court Annexed Mediation Programs. Most of the judges had completed an ABA-
98. Conversations with Judge Peter Norell (San Bemadino), Judge Denise LeFluer (Santa Barbara),
Alexander Williams (Los Angeles), Judge Robert B. Atact (Santa Cruz), and Judge John Van de Camp
(Sacramento).
99. Napa Judges Cut Caseloads Using Mediation Skills, COURT NEWS [OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL





103. Id. Snowden states, "A court's place is to serve the community. We're trying to redefine what it
is to be a superior court. This is the most exciting project I've been involved with in all my years as a
judge. It's just a matter of reprioritizing resources to save trial time down the road. Litigants have
been very receptive and grateful." Id.
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sponsored mediation training program for judges that the author helped teach, and
there was general support for judges serving as mediators.
When the issue of judges mediating cases assigned to them for trial arose,
members of .the committee expressed serious opposition. Creative brainstorming
resulted in the suggestion of judges being organized into clusters that could medi-
ate each others' cases, but concern about judges mediating cases assigned to them
for trial was significant.' 04 The comiittee decided that Delaware's court-annexed
mediation program would avoid such a practice.
10 5
Resolution of the controversy regarding judges mediating cases assigned to
them for trial is necessary because either the blossoming of or refraining from the
practice needs to be corrected. If legitimate concerns cannot be addressed, the
court programs in San Luis Obispo and Napa Counties, and the increasing practice
of individual judges, needs to be constrained. If the concerns can be resolved
through, for example, a clarification of judicial ethics in settlement proceedings,
then the restraint in Delaware should be relaxed.
B. Legal Commentators Are Conflicted about Judges Mediating Cases
Assigned to Them for Trial
1. Concerns
The practice of judges mediating cases assigned to them for trial must come
under careful scrutiny when thoughtful dispute resolution advocates such as Frank
Sander and James Alfini argue against the practice. 10 6 Sander's Friendly Amend-
ment article' 7 identifies four reasons why Frank Sander's multi-door court-
house 1°8 does not include judges mediating cases assigned to them for trial: undue
coercion, role confusion (leadiig to possible misuse of confidential information),
competence and training, and appearance of impropriety.l°9
Dean Alfini observes that the convergence of the managerial judge and alter-
native dispute resolution movements has transformed the role of American civil
trial judges. He argues that judges mediating cases assigned to them for trial is
problematic because the only guidance provided by the judicial ethical standards
are blanket statements in favor of impartiality and against coercion. The trial
judge's personal interest in managing the docket, and the parties' awareness of
that interest, creates too great a risk of coercion for the trial judge to be involved
in settlement discussions. He concludes that updated standards of judicial ethics
should require judges to receive mediation training as a prerequisite to intervening
in settlement, clarify permissible limits of judicial intervention, and consider a
104. Conversations with the author on May 28, 2003.
105. Id.
106. See James J. Alfini, Risk of Coercion Too Great: Judges Should Not Mediate Cases Assigned to
Them for Trial, DisP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 11; Frank E. A. Sander, A Friendly Amendment,
DisP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 11.
107. Sander, supra note 106, at 11.
108. See THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (A. Levin & R.
Wheeler eds., 1979) (for a history and explanation of the multi-door courthouse concept).
109. Sander, supra note 106, at 11.
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"bright line rule" prohibiting judges from mediating cases assigned to them for
trial. 110
Other authorities agree that a trial judge should not act as the mediator in
cases he or she might later try. Robert B. McKay, an ardent advocate of court-
annexed alternative dispute resolution, assumes without explanation that "federal
judges should not themselves function as mediators in cases which they might
later try."' H Chief Judge Robert F. Peckham suggests that settlement negotiations
be referred to a second judge or magistrate "to insure the appearance of impartial-
ity and to encourage attorneys to participate with candor."'112 Describing his con-
cerns about potential coercion, premature decision making, and a reluctance to
share crucial information, Patrick E. Longan concluded, "[s]omeone other than the
judge who will preside over trial needs to conduct the mediation." 113 Citing many
similar concerns, Martin Frey concluded, "[t]he mediation process lacks fairness
when the trial judge acts as the mediator in his or her own case."' 1 4 One court
even declared that "mediation should be left to the mediators and judging to the
judges."' 15
2. Endorsements
The practice of judges mediating cases assigned to them for trial also has its
supporters. Professor Marc Galanter's scholarship cites numerous sources sup-
porting the practice. 16 Federal District Judge Harold Baer argues that judge-led
mediation lends the process an air of legitimacy for clients who want to know that
they are participating in a viable substitute for litigation and specifically refutes
many of the criticisms with these explanations."17
Another central criticism of judicial mediation argues that, not only is it a
waste of resources for a federal judge to act as mediator, but it is also un-
ethical for a judge to mediate a case that appears on his own docket. An
allied concern is that acting as a case manager is not part of a federal
judge's job description and that a judge should do nothing of the kind.
Remarkably, though, this criticism does not spill over to the allied realm
of settlement conferences. In order to understand the criticism more
fully, then, we must examine the differences between settlement confer-
ences and mediation. As mentioned above, settlement conferences are
governed by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 16
110. Alfini, supra note 106, at 14.
111. Robert B. McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 63 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 818,
827 (1988).
112. Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-
Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 263 (1985).
113. Patrick E. Longan, Bureaucratic Justice Meets ADR: The Emerging Role for Magistrates as
Mediators, 73 NEB. L. REv. 712, 738 (1994).
114. Martin A. Frey, Does ADR Offer Second Class Justice? 36 TULSA L.J. 727, 760 (2001).
115. Evans v. State, 603 So. 2d. 15, 17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
116. See generally Galanter, supra note 54.
117. Harold Baer, Jr., Judges' Forum No. 2: History, Process, and a Role for Judges in Mediating
Their Own Cases, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 131, 138 (2001).
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was amended in 1983 so as to "validate what many judges were already
doing," and provided specific authority for judges who had up until then
been reluctant to discuss settlement with parties because of uncertainty
about their authority to do so. The Advisory Committee's notes to Rule
16 state that the amendment "recognizes that it has become common-
place to discuss settlement at pretrial conferences. Since it obviously
eases crowed court dockets and results in savings to the litigants and ju-
dicial system, settlement should be facilitated at as early a stage of the
litigation as possible."
It is true that settlement conferences are generally less pro-active than
mediations. Unlike settlement conferences, mediations involve an in-
quiry into the pros and cons contended for by each side, the presence and
participation of the parties, submissions, ex parte caucus, and a search for
creative solutions. They also take longer than do settlement conferences.
There may, however, be a modicum of arm twisting in both settlement
conferences and mediations, as both invariably involve an effort to con-
vince one side or the other that a proposed resolution is a fair one ....
Thus, although the judge is somewhat more involved in the mediation
process than in a settlement conference, it is odd that critics frown upon
participation in one and not the other, since both involve the judge's rec-
ommendation as to an appropriate resolution.
Particular criticism of an Article III judge's mediation of a case comes
primarily from academics (who frequently possess little practical experi-
ence). Criticisms include a suggestion that judges either do not under-
stand confidential communications or cannot be trusted to use them in an
unbiased manner; and, too, that regardless of a judge's good intentions, if
the judge conducts a mediation that does not come to closure and then
tries the same case, he may "inflict his wrath" on the party he believes
kept him from reaching closure. That this may happen is hard to deny
categorically. However, it seems to me that such a judge would likely
take sides at some stage of the litigation anyway. Therefore, ought
judges be barred from the mediation process and all the advantages it
holds on the unlikely chance that an extremely small percentage of
judges will not act impartially? Judges who have sworn to do their job
objectively do their job, and do it well-without regard to who the liti-
gants may be and certainly without regard to whether six months earlier
they had conducted a failed mediation. Further, the fact that any number
of appellate decisions credit district judges with the ability in bench trials
to make impartial, discretionary decisions, such as what statements do or
do not constitute hearsay, lends support to this view. Most litigators will
agree that hardly a trial goes by where some action by some lawyer could
be off-putting to the judge-far more off-putting, I dare say, than not
reaching closure after a couple of hours of mediation. No suggestion has
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been made, however, that a judge need recuse him or herself when a liti-
gator is off-putting."
8
It is important to note that even an ardent supporter of trial judges mediating
their own cases, like Judge Baer, recommended against the practice in bench, as
opposed to jury, trials." 19
Rather than refute criticisms, Edward Brunet articulated a unique advantage
to judges being allowed to mediate cases assigned to them for trial. 120 Professor
Brunet described his conversion from the "modem" view that trial judges should
never be allowed to mediate cases' 2 1 to a position against "an inflexible rule,
mandating routine reassignment" of the settlement function away from the trial
judge. 22 Professor Brunet explained that natural human behavior is that "[d]eci-
sion makers do not wait until all the evidence relevant to a choice has been col-
lected to begin their evaluations." 123 Thus, Professor Brunet argued that decision
making is an evolving process, like keeping score in a nine-inning baseball
game.124 He then suggested there may be legitimate advantages for the partici-
pants to know the decision maker's view of the issues and arguments in interim
stages.' 25 Judicial mediation by the trial judge allows the ultimate decision maker
to "signal" to the participants his or her evolving reactions to the case, empower-
ing the participants to reach an informed settlement. 126 While Professor Brunet
pointed out that this dynamic is controversial, it also provides a unique advantage
to having the trial judge mediate her own cases. 127
C. Empirical Data Regarding Judges' Attitudes and Practices
1. Attitudes
The survey128 asked judges to indicate the degree to which they agreed or dis-
agreed129 with the statement: "With the consent of the parties, I believe that civil
118. Id. at 144-47. (internal citations omitted).
119. Id. at 150-51.
120. Edward Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling, 3 NEV. L.J. 232 (2003).
121. Id. at 232-33.
122. Id. at 233.
123. Id. at 254.
124. Id. at 255.
125. Id. at 255-56.
126. Id. at 253-54. He explains:
Viewed in this light, a signal from the bench may advance decisional efficiency and enhance the
opportunity for settlement. Without a signal, the judge may feel, for example, that the defen-
dant's affirmative defense looks unlikely to succeed, but the defense counsel may feel confident
about her defense. A significant informational asymmetry exists. Once the court signals on the
issue, the informational asymmetry is lessened substantially. The defendant and her lawyer know
which way the judge is leaning and can adjust their settlement strategy accordingly.
Id.
127. Id. at 239.
128. See infra app. A.
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or family law judges should be allowed to mediate cases assigned to them for
trial." Judges' reactions to this statement are summarized in Table 6.
Mediation Should Be Allowed: By Strength of Response






Did Not Answer 33
Table 6
Comparing the combined "Strongly Agree" and "Agree" categories with the
combined "Strongly Disagree" and "Disagree" categories reveals a 218 to 87
(71% of those with an opinion) acceptance of judges mediating their own cases.
The ratios are approximately consistent, regardless of family law, general civil,
limited jurisdiction civil, or complex civil assignment by the responding judge. 130
While a 71% acceptance rate for judges mediating their own cases establishes a
credible judicial community norm, it again reveals significant dissent within the
community.
A point of reference to interpret this data would be the same judges' attitudes
about conducting settlement conferences for cases assigned to them for trial. The
questions were asked side by side, without defining or differentiating between the
processes; the data reveals whether the judges perceive that the processes are dif-
ferent and should be treated differently.
It is both interesting and predictable that judges more readily accept the
proposition of judges conducting settlement conferences for their own cases
(82%), as compared to the proposition of judges mediating their own cases (71%).
It is predictable because mediation is the "new kid on the block" compared to
judicial settlement conferences. It is interesting because it is difficult to distin-
guish between the two processes.
To further explore this aspect of the data, the responses to these questions will
be discussed in three categories: judges who supported both mediations and set-
tlement conferences, judges who disapproved of both mediations and settlement
conferences, and judges who were split in their opinions. The following percent-
ages are of the 325 judges who answered both questions and expressed an opinion
on one of the questions.
130. Mediation Should be Allowed: By Response Strength and Assignment
Number of Responses (FREQ)
Q1A For Mediation Overall Family Law General Civil Limited Juris Complex Civil
Strongly Disagree 38 7 14 1 1
Disagree 49 12 18 4 1
No Opinion 30 5 11 1 0
Agree 83 20 28 6 1
Strongly Agree 135 25 50 10 3
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Sixty-one percent (203 out of 325) of the judges indicated that they agreed or
strongly agreed with both statements about judges conducting mediations or set-
tlement conferences for cases assigned to them for trial. These judges not only
support both processes, but ranked their support identically for the two processes
89% percent of the time.
Sixteen percent (52 out of 325) of the judges indicated that they disagreed or
strongly disagreed with both statements about judges mediating or conducting
settlement conferences for cases assigned to them for trial.
Perhaps most interesting is that 17% (56 out of 325) of the judges had a dif-
ferent reaction for judges conducting settlement conferences versus judges con-
ducting mediations. The criterion for this group was that their responses in the 1
to 5 rating in the survey were at least two degrees different. That means that
judges who responded to one question with "Strongly Agree" and to the other
question with "No Opinion" would be counted. Similarly, judges who responded
with the combination of "Agree" and "Disagree," and "No Opinion" and
"Strongly Disagree" would be included in the 17% of judges characterized as
conflicted about this issue. This last point is interesting because these judges ap-
parently perceive that there were, or should be, differences between the two proc-
esses.
Viewing the data more broadly, the sample of California judges in 2004 were
largely supportive (71% agreed or strongly agreed) of the concept of judges medi-
ating cases assigned to them for trial, with the parties' consent. Nevertheless, the
support for this proposition was less than the support for judges conducting set-
tlement conferences under the same circumstances (82%), and with respect to
mediation, there was a larger percentage of judges (29%) with a dissenting view.
2. Practices
As with settlement conferences, the amount of attention that should be paid to
this issue will depend on the pervasiveness of the practice. The survey attempted
to document the frequency of the occurrence by asking the judges three questions:
(1) how often they label judge-led settlement proceedings "mediations" (as com-
pared to the label of "settlement conferences"); (2) the number of settlement pro-
ceedings that they labeled "mediations" they conduct per week; and (3) the per-
centage of those mediations that are for cases assigned to them for trial.
a. Extent Settlement Proceedings Are Labeled "Mediation"
First the survey asked judges to fill in blanks for the following question:
When I schedule meetings to try to help settle a case:
a. I label those meetings settlement conferences _ % of the time; and
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The response to this question is important because it quantifies the degree to
which the attitudinal support for judicial mediation reflected above' 3 1 was mani-
fest in practice. The following table reveals the frequency judges used the two
labels for their settlement meetings:
Extent Settlement Proceedings Are Labeled "Mediation" versus "Settlement Con-
ference"
Percentage of times labeled Percentage of times labeled Number of judges



















Eighty-five percent (228 out of 268) of judges answering this question always
use the label of "settlement conference" when meeting with the parties to help
settle a case. Only 1.1% (3 out of 268) always use the label of "mediation," and
only 5% (14 out of 268) use the label of "mediation" half of the time or more.
The ratios are fairly consistent across assignments.
The small number of judges using the label, "mediation," was surprising in
light of the theoretical support for the proposition that judges should be allowed to
conduct mediations documented above. 132 The survey established that judicial
attitudes support the right of a judge to mediate, but practice is to almost always
label such meetings settlement conferences.
b. Frequency of Judicial Mediation
Second, the survey asked, "The number of settlement meetings I conduct a
week is about __ ." Separate answers were requested for mediations and settle-
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ment conferences. The responses, by the judges' assignments, for mediation are
summarized below in Table 9.
Number of Mediations per Week: By Percentage of Judges Who Responded
Number Family Law General Civil Limited Juris Complex Civil
0 8.5% (1) 100% (1)
1/-1 29%(2) 41% (5) 50%(1)
2 29% (2) 34% (4) 50%(l)
3
4-6 42% (3) 17% (2)
Table 9
A major problem is that the prior question about using the label of "media-
tion" revealed that only 40 judges reported conducting any mediations. Of those
40, 18 either didn't answer this question or cannot be isolated by judicial assign-
ment because they reported multiple assignments. The result is that the responses
of only 22 judges can be reported. Such a small sample becomes increasingly
suspect when it is divided into the four categories of judicial assignments. While
informative, the small sample does not permit the data to be authoritative.
It is interesting that judges using the label, "mediations," are largely divided
into three frequencies: those who conduct them once a week or less, those who do
two a week, and those who do four to six per week. These fairly small frequen-
cies of judicial mediations are important because it begins to document judicial
norms at a given time in one region. The dramatic reallocations of judicial re-
sources in San Luis Obispo and Napa Counties' 33 are still very much the exception
rather than the rule in California.
c. Extent Settlement Judge Is the Trial Judge
Third, the questionnaire asked the judge to fill in a blank for the question,
"The percentage of my settlement meetings that are for cases in which I am as-
signed as the trial judge is about: _." Separate answers were requested for set-
tlement conferences and mediations, if any. Table 10, below, describes the re-
sponses, by judicial assignment, for mediations.
Percentage of Mediations in Which Settlement Judge Is the Same as Trial Judge
Percentage Family Law General Civil Limited Juris. Complex Civil
0 17%(1)
10 17% (1) 33% (2)






133. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text.
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Again the sample is so small that it may be informative, but not authoritative.
The patterns are generally similar to the patterns for the settlement conferences.
Half of the general civil judges who reported conducting "mediations" do it for
cases assigned to them for trial 95% of the time while the other half do it 10% or
less of the time. Like with settlement conferences, there is greater receptivity of
the practice in family law assignments than in general civil. Again, the limited
jurisdiction judges seem to have similar attitudes as the family law judges.
IV. JUDICIAL ETHICS CURRENTLY AUTHORIZE THE PRACTICE ... BUT
THAT COULD CHANGE
A. Analysis of Current Statements of Judicial Ethics
Another perspective on the propriety of the judicial settlement conference ex-
perience is to consider the rules articulating judicial ethics. Dean Alfini, a noted
scholar on judicial ethics, concluded that the current ethical standards permit
judges to attempt to settle cases assigned to them for trial, 134 but an exploration of
the standards may be instructive.
The ABA publishes a Model Code of Judicial Conduct (hereinafter the
ABA's Model Canons) which serves as a platform for various jurisdictions to
make modifications and then adopt the controlling codes for judges under their
authority. This article will consider the ABA's Model Canons, 135 and compare the
Code of Conduct for United States Judges' 36 and the California Code of Judicial
Ethics. 137
A review of the ABA's Model Canons for guidance on the boundaries of
judges involved in settlement activity reveals the following pertinent provisions:
1. Canon 1 states, "A Judge Shall Uphold the Integrity and Independ-
ence of the Judiciary."' 
38
2. Canon 2 states, "A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance
of impropriety in all of the judge's activities." The advisory committee
commentary specifies, 'The test for appearance of impropriety is whether
the conduct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the
judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impar-
tiality and competence is impaired.'
139
134. Alfini, supra note 106, at 11.
135. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.orglcpr/mcjc/toc.html.
136. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES (2000), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/chl .html#N 1_.
137. CAL. CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (2005), available at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/appendix/appdiv2.pdf.
138. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT at Canon 1.
139. Id. at Canon 2.
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3. Canon 3 states, "A Judge Shall Perform the Duties of Judicial Office
Impartiality and Diligently." Section B is titled, "Adjudicative Respon-
sibilities" and has 11 subsections."40 Pertinent provisions include:
(1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge ex-
cept those in which disqualification is required.
(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, ....
lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity.
(8) A judge shall dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently
and fairly. 141
The commentary for this subsection explains,
In disposing of matters promptly, efficiently and fairly, a judge must
demonstrate due regard for the rights of the parties to be heard and to
have issues resolved without unnecessary cost or delay. Containing costs
while preserving fundamental rights of parties also protects the interests
of witnesses and the general public. A judge should monitor and super-
vise cases so as to reduce or eliminate dilatory practices, avoidable de-
lays and unnecessary costs. A judge should encourage and seek to facili-
tate settlement, but parties should not feel coerced into surrendering the
right to have their controversy resolved by the courts.1
4 2
Other pertinent provisions of Canon 3B include:
(7) ... A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte com-
munications... concerning a pending or impending proceeding ex-
cept that: ... (d) A judge may, with the consent of the parties, confer
separately with the parties and their lawyers in an effort to mediate
or settle matters pending before the judge.
(9) A judge shall not, while a proceeding is pending or impending in
any court, . . . make any non public comment that might substantially
interfere with a fair trial or hearing.
143
The ABA's Model Canons authorize judges to attempt to settle cases assigned
to them for trial. 44 While explaining Canon 3B(8)'s duty to dispose of judicial
140. Id. at Canon 3.
141. Id. at Canon 3B(1), (4), (8).
142. Id. at Canon 3B(8) cmt.
143. Id. at Canon 3B(7), (9).
144. Id. at Canon 3B(7)(d).
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matters promptly, efficiently and fairly, the commentary specifies that "a judge
should encourage and seek to facilitate settlement."'' 45 Canon 3B(7)(d) clarifies
that a judge needs the consent of the parties for ex parte communications when
attempting to mediate or settle matters pending before the judge. 146 The implica-
tion is that, in the absence of ex parte communications, the judge does not need
the consent of the parties to facilitate settlement in a matter pending before the
judge.
The following six limitations for judges facilitating settlement for cases as-
signed to them for trial can be extrapolated from the ABA's Model Canons:
1. The settlement facilitating judge should not engage in any behavior that
would undermine the integrity of the judiciary. 147
2. A judge should not be the trial judge for a case that he has tried to settle if
what the judge learned in settlement proceedings, including private sessions if
utilized, "would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability to
carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and competence is
impaired."'
148
3. A judge must "be patient, dignified, and courteous" to everyone she may
have contact with in the course of facilitating settlement.
149
4. A judge "must demonstrate due regard for the rights of the parties to be
heard" and to "preserv[e] fundamental rights of parties."' 150  The duty to "have
145. Id. at Canon 3B(8). The rationale before this statement cautions that fundamental rights must be
preserved, but seems to acknowledge that a judge should protect an interest of the general public in
containing costs and reducing delay. It could be argued that these interests authorize the judicial en-
couragement of settlement for the purposes of docket management. Stating that judges should "moni-
tor and supervise cases" for these ends suggest that the Rules of Judicial Conduct support the manage-
rial judge. Id.
146. Id. at Canon 3B(7)(d).
147. Id. at Canon 1. This could lead to a special standard of mediation practice in which the sitting
judge has a greater duty to protect the integrity of the process and his or her role. The relative absence
of ethical standards for settlement judges is concerning. See, e.g., Alfini, supra note 106, at 12 ("The
Model Code of Judicial Ethics admonishes judges not to be coercive in settlement, but provides no
guidance as to how or when ajudge's behavior may be deemed coercive"). The ABA Dispute Resolu-
tion Section's proposal to augment Canon 3B's statement of Adjudicatory Responsibilities with a new
section specifying "Settlement Responsibilities" is a helpful beginning. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (Proposed Addition by the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution Feb. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/resources/comm-rules-aba-dispute%20resolution_020405-ddt.p
df. The challenge becomes to conceptualize whether, and if so how, the duties of settling judges (with
a duty of upholding the integrity of judiciary) are different than the duties of private sector mediators.
For example, a federal judge strongly rebuked the Houston chapter head of the Association of Attor-
ney-Mediators for publicly saying that "what most people might consider a little bullying is really just
part of how mediation works." Allen v. Leal, 27 F. Supp. 2d 945, 947-48 (S.D. Tex. 1998). Similarly,
the California Supreme Court has ruled that a judge's self-claimed "assertive" style of settling cases,
which included shouting at a crying plaintiff, was inappropriate. Dodds v. Comm'n on Judicial Per-
formance, 906 P.2d 1260, 1266, 1270 (Cal. 1996).
Even an otherwise just settlement, if imposed summarily and coercively, is likely to disserve jus-
tice by leaving the parties with a lingering resentment of one another and the judicial system...
when a judge, clothed with the prestige and authority of his judicial office, repeatedly interrupts a
litigant and yells angrily and without adequate provocation, the judge exceeds his proper role and
casts disrepute on the judicial office.
Id.
148. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT at Canon 2 cmt. This Canon is the foundation for Robert
McKay's article on the subject. McKay, supra note 111.
149. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT at Canon 3B(4).
150. Id. at Canon 3B(8) cmt.
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issues resolved without unnecessary delay,"'15 1 seems pointed at eliminating dila-
tory behavior by parties, but a case could be made that it imposes a duty on a
judge to not unnecessarily delay a ruling or trial to force a settlement. Similarly,
this provision imposes a duty that "parties should not feel coerced into surrender-
ing the right to have their controversy resolved by the courts." This aspect of
subsection (8) could be found to be reinforced by the duty on a judge "to hear and
decide matters assigned to the judge."'15 2
5. A judge must acquire the parties' permission to utilize ex parte conversa-
tions as part of the settlement effort of matters pending before that judge. 153
6. A judge cannot make any nonpublic comment that might substantially in-
terfere with a fair trial or hearing of a matter that is pending or impending in any
court.154 Thus, judges facilitating settlement must be cautious about private com-
ments that might be construed to interfere with a fair trial. Examples could in-
clude comments to parties in caucus for cases assigned to that judge for trial and
hallway comments to the trial judge if the settlement judge is not the trial judge.
The provision states that judges can make "public statements in the course of their
official duties." A judge's comments in ex parte caucus while facilitating settle-
ment are probably part of his official duties, but those comments might not be
deemed to be public.
There are only two provisions in the Codes of Conduct for Federal judges that
differ enough from the ABA's Model Canons to mention. The prohibition against
commenting on pending cases specifies public comments only and does not ex-
tend to non-public comments. 155 The requirement of acquiring parties' permission
for ex parte conversations as part of settlement applies to "pending matters" as
opposed to "matters pending before the judge."' 56 This could suggest that such
permission is necessary for all pending cases, including cases not assigned to the
settlement judge for trial.
California's Code of Judicial Ethics follows the same structure as the ABA's
Model Canons but provides a few modifications in language. An important dif-
ference is Canon 3B(9), which specifies that "This Canon does not prohibit judges
from making statements in the course of their official duties .... " The ABA's
Model Canons use similar language, but only in reference to public statements.
The difference could be significant in the case of private comments in an ex parte
caucus while facilitating settlement. Another interesting difference is the Advi-
sory Committee Commentary for California's Canon 3B(8), which states, "The
obligation of a judge to dispose of matters promptly and efficiently must not take
precedence over the judge's obligation to dispose of matters fairly and with pa-
tience."
California's Advisory Comments set a clearer standard on the priority be-
tween docket management and better outcomes. Caseload management efficiency
must not take precedence over patient judges disposing of matters fairly. The
151. Id.
152. Id. at Canon 3B(1).
153. Id. at Canon 3B(7)(d).
154. Id. at Canon 3B(9).
155. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3A(6), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/ch1.html#3.
156. Id. at Canon 3A(4).
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same message can be deduced from the language in the ABA's Model Canon, but
it is unequivocal in California's provision.
B. Proposed Revisions
The ABA's Model Canons are in the midst of a two-year revision project for
the first time in eighteen years.157 The ABA's Section of Dispute Resolution has
proposed that the Model Canons include a new paragraph to address "Settlement
Responsibilities." 15 8 In addition to prohibiting a judge from acting "in a manner
that coerces a party into settlement," 159 this proposal also states, "Ordinarily, a
judge should not conduct a settlement conference or mediation in a case in which
the judge will serve as the adjudicator of the merits of the case.'16° This initiative
has been presented to the joint commission revising the Model Canons by nation-
ally prominent ADR leaders.1
61
The ABA's Dispute Resolution Section proposal includes a commentary that
explains the proposed prohibition against judges mediating cases assigned to them
for trial. The pertinent section of the commentary states,
When conducting settlement conferences or mediations, particularly
when caucusing (i.e., ex parte conversations with parties and /or litigants)
is used, judges become aware of parties' confidential information to
which they would not be privy, had they not conducted the settlement ac-
tivity. If the parties do not settle and the judge later tries the case, this
confidential information is often difficult for the judge to separate from
evidence that the judge hears when adjudicating the merits of a case. The
result is that, often, the confidential information serves to bias the adjudi-
cating judge in favor of or against one or more of the parties to the dis-
pute, thus compromising the integrity of the adjudication process. Sec-
tion 3C(2) recognizes these facts and additionally counsels against the
settlement judge being the adjudicating judge. The word "ordinarily"
recognizes that there may be instances where this section should not ap-
ply. For example, there may be situations where a jurisdiction may have
only a single judge and/or where the parties, having been fully informed
of the possible consequences of having one judge serve in both the set-
tlement and adjudication role, nonetheless jointly agree to such proce-
dure. 1
62
157. ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Introduction to Final
Draft Report (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/IntroductoryReportFinal.pdf.
158. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (Proposed Addition by the ABA Section of Dispute Reso-
lution Feb. 4, 2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/resources/comm_rules.aba dispute%20resolution 020405_ddt.p
df.
159. Id. at C(l).
160. Id. at C(2).
161. See Molly McDonough, Meddling in Settling: Pressure to Clear Caseloads Spurs Judges to
Coerce Settlements, Critics Say, 91-JUN A.B.A. J. 14 (2005).
162. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (Proposed Addition by the ABA Section of Dispute Reso-
lution Feb. 4, 2005) at cmt. (on file with author).
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The result of the equivocation in the proposed Canon and commentary is a
failure to resolve the issue. On one hand, the commentary identifies the concerns,
concluding that the process biases the judge and compromises the integrity of the
adjudication process. On the other hand, it permits the process when agreed to by
informed parties and acknowledges that at times it appears necessary. The pro-
posal could have declared that this practice incurably compromises the integrity of
the adjudicatory process and should be forbidden. Instead, the language is quali-
fied by the word "ordinarily." The comment then explains that, arguably, the
practice can continue as long as either the parties make a knowing waiver, or the
judge faces logistical challenges. 63
If this proposal is adopted, does it require a judge to acquire consent from the
parties to conduct a non-caucus settlement conference? The current Model Code
of Judicial Conduct already requires consent from the parties for ex parte commu-
nications (caucus) in settlement conferences. 64 How should judges reconcile the
apparent conflict between this proposed judicial ethic and the statutory permission
for judges to conduct settlement conferences? 165
It is interesting that the proposal goes beyond the recent concern about judges
mediating cases assigned to them for trial and includes the practice of conducting
settlement conferences. Including both processes in the proposal acknowledges
that the criticisms and concerns apply to both processes. It is noteworthy that both
the proposed language and commentary use the word "or" between the processes
to suggest they are distinctive. Should the commission distinguish between these
processes by forbidding judges from conducting mediations, but accepting the
comparatively established practice of judges conducting settlement conferences?
Illumination and, hopefully, resolution of the controversy about judges con-
ducting settlement conferences and mediations for cases assigned to them for trial
would be helpful to the entities responsible for regulating judicial conduct. Once
these issues are resolved by the ABA's joint commission for the Model Code, it
will be repeated on the state levels as states wrestle with updating their codes of
judicial ethics.
V. ADDING JUDICIAL MEDIATION FURTHER CONFUSES THE LAW
A. Confusion in the Law Regarding Settlement Conferences for Cases
Assigned for Trial
Professor Daisy Hurst Floyd's article entitled, Can the Judge Do That? - The
Need for Clearer Judicial Role in Settlement,166 presents many of the pertinent
163. Id. The commentary seems to approve the practice if there is only one judge in a jurisdiction;
but the question arises: what if there are other judges, but they are either unwilling or untalented at
facilitating settlement? This is not quite the "bright line test" that Dean Alfini suggested be consid-
ered. Alfini, supra note 106, at 14.
164. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDuCr Canon 3(B)(7) (2004), available at
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/toc.html.
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 16. For one interpretation of the scope of FRCP 16, see McKay, supra note 111,
at 822-23.
166. Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do That? - The Need for a Clearer Judicial Role in Settle-
ment, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45 (1994).
No. 2]
31
Robinson: Robinson: Adding Judicial Mediation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
aspects of the law regarding settlement conferences. She traces how case law
relies on a trial court's inherent authority and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16
to establish the right of a federal district judge to conduct settlement conferences
for her own cases.
167
Professor Floyd examines many cases determining whether a judge's behav-
ior in settlement constituted judicial misconduct for the purposes of either recusal
of the trial judge or reversal of a trial court decision. 168 She summarizes an impor-
tant aspect of the law in this arena:
Unless a judge's remarks demonstrate such pervasive bias or prejudice
that one party is actually prejudiced, the bias must stem from an extraju-
dicial source to be disqualifying. A source of bias is extrajudicial if the
bias "is not derived from the evidence or conduct of the parties that the
judge observes in the course of the proceedings." The requirement of an
extrajudicial source for the bias has been the basis for many courts reject-
ing an argument that the trial court should be disqualified for bias based
on conduct during pre-trial proceedings. 169
Floyd's article described several pretrial behaviors by trial judges found to be
acceptable:
" A statement that "he had seen better cases before and that the case
did not impress him;'
7 0
" Expressions of skepticism about the validity of a defense;' 7'
" Forming opinions about the credibility of counsel;1 72
" A statement that the lawsuit was a "personal tragedy for the defen-
dants" who were "honest men of high character;"'
173
" A statement to plaintiff that "these matters never work out for a
plaintiff unless they are settled and that he [the plaintiff] ought to
settle because the judge could not rule in his favor ... ;"174 and
" A statement that the judge was "outraged by the fact that in this day
and age a man's life could be ruined because he stole a few sand-
wiches," which was the defendant's justification for firing an em-
ployee. 1
75
Despite the clear authority for federal judges to conduct settlement confer-
ences for their own cases and the difficulty of having a judge removed or reversed
for bias due to pretrial behaviors, Floyd also revealed some mixed results when
courts have attempted to define the limits of a federal judge's power in settle-
ment. 17 6 For example, one appellate court found that a trial judge exceeded his
authority when he followed through on his threat to impose sanctions if the parties
167. Id. at 45 passim.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 68 (citations omitted).
170. Pau v. Yosemite Park and Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1991).
171. N.L.R.B. v. Honaker Mills, 789 F.2d 262, 265 (4th Cir. 1986).
172. In re Ellis, 108 B.R. 262, 266 (D. Haw. 1989).
173. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 291 (3d Cir.1980).
174. Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 1986).
175. Fong v. American Airlines, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 1334, 1338 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
176. Hurst Floyd, supra note 166, at 57.
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waited until trial to settle within a suggested range.177 Another appellate court,
though, found that it was within a trial court's authority to impose sanctions for
the parties' failure to comply with the trial court's deadline to conclude negotia-
tions two weeks before trial.
178
The confusion in the law regarding judges seeking to settle cases assigned to
them for trial is amplified when considering state law. The Connecticut Supreme
Court has ruled that "[wihen a judge engages in a pretrial settlement discussion in
a court case, he should automatically disqualify himself from presiding in the case
in order to eliminate any appearance of impropriety."' 17 9 The Montana Supreme
Court requires the disqualification of a judge who will be trier of fact if that judge
participates in unsuccessful pretrial settlement negotiations and is requested to do
so by one of the parties. 18  In contrast, the case law in Hawaii and California es-
tablishes that trial judges need not recuse themselves, even in bench trials, simply
because they conduct settlement conferences in cases assigned to them for trial.' 8 1
B. California As an Example of How Judicial Mediation Creates Addi-
tional Confusion in the Law
1. Determining Mediation Confidentiality by the "Label of Process"
Like many states, California has a statute that provides for the confidentiality
of mediations.' 82 The application of these provisions was clarified by the Califor-
nia Supreme Court in Foxgate Homeowners Ass'n. v. Bramalea California, Inc.
18 3
177. Kothe v. Smith 771 F.2d 667, 668-69 (2d Cir. 1985).
178. Newton v. A.C. & S., Inc., 918 F.2d 1121, 1126 (3d Cir. 1990).
179. Timm v. Timm, 487 A.2d 191, 193 (Conn. 1985).
180. Shields v. Thunem, 716 P.2d 217, 218-19 (Mont. 1985).
181. See, e.g., Moran v. Guerreiro, 37 P.3d 603, 621-23 (Haw. 2001).
Moran now argues that Judge Nakatani ... should have recused heself from presiding over the
various order to show cause hearings because she was privy to confidential information as a re-
sult of settlement negotiations .... In light of [Associates Fin. Servs. v. Mijo, 950 P.2d 1219
(1998),] in which the Hawaii Supreme Court upheld the propriety of a trial judge encouraging
settlement of a case on the eve of trial, we disagree with Moran that information Judge Nakatani
was privy to during settlement negotiations disqualified her from reviewing the [later] settlement
agreement").
Id. See also Roth v. Parker, 57 Cal. App. 4th 542, 547, 549 (Ct. App. 1997).
When the case was called for trial, defendants Perez and Parker, who had posted jury fees, in-
formed the court that they were waiving ajury trial and would prefer a court trial. Roth's counsel
stated then that '[U]nder those circumstances I would request that this court recuse itself from
trying this case .... Your honor participated intensely ... in a mandatory settlement conference.
And there have been ex parte communications to the court by both sides. The court seemed to
have formed [an opinion on the] value of this case ..... ... The court responded, 'Well, Mr.
Roth... to take your position to an extreme, no IC [i.e., individual or all purpose calendar] court
could ever participate in any settlement conference other than pro forma settlement discussions..
. And there's nothing that I know of that indicates that a judge who fully participates in a set-
tlement conference has to automatically recuse himself or herself from ... court trial. I don't
force anybody to settle .... I have ... no preconceived ideas of the case.' .. . We also note that
the mere fact that Judge Romero participated in settlement discussions is not a proper ground for
disqualification under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.2 ....
Id.
182. CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 1115-28 (2004).
183. 25 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2001).
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The issue in Foxgate was whether a retired judge could submit a declaration in
support of a motion for sanctions against a party who allegedly sabotaged a me-
diation. The court concluded that the statute prohibits such behavior. The struc-
ture of the statute and reasoning of the court creates a chaotic state of the law for
judicial mediation.
The Foxgate court's reasoning attempts to conform to the statute's distinction
between mediation and settlement conferences. The statute specifies, "This chap-
ter does not apply to ... [a] settlement conference pursuant to Rule 222 of the
California Rules of Court."'184
Applying this statute, the court reasoned:
Had [the retired judge] been classified as a special master ordered to re-
port to the court, his report would not have been subject to the mediation
confidentiality statutes and would be governed by the parties' agreement
to the CMO provision for reporting. The superior court CMO states:
"[The] Judge . . . is appointed as Special Master pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure Sec 638 et seq., and shall act as mediator for settlement
conferences and as discovery referee. The Special Master shall rule on
all discovery disputes, shall assist in the implementation of the Order and
shall preside over mediation conferences and make any orders governing
the attendance of parties and their representatives thereat." Amicus cu-
riae ... suggests that Judge Smith acted as though he was conducting a
settlement conference and asks this court to clarify the differences be-
tween a settlement conference at which a court may, on its own motion,
sanction a party for not participating (Code of Civ. Proc., Sec 177.5) and
mediation ..... We have no occasion to do so here. It seems clear from
the record, and the parties appear to agree, that the proceeding about
which Judge Smith reported was a mediation proceeding and the judge
was acting as a mediator. 185
The court thus predicated its upholding of mediation confidentiality on a find-
ing that the judge was presiding over "a mediation proceeding and the judge was
acting as a mediator."186 The court appears to affirm that had the proceedings
been found to be a settlement conference or had the judge been acting as a Special
Master, the result would be different.187 The Foxgate court could have found that
the judge was serving in any one of three capacities: a Special Master who is re-
quired to submit reports to the court, a settlement conference judge who had
power to sanction a party for not participating, or a mediator in a mediation pro-
ceeding who is required to maintain confidentiality. The propriety of the judge's
conduct would be dramatically different depending on his status.
This creates confusion in the law regarding judicial mediation because of the
difficulty of distinguishing between a settlement conference and judicial media-
tion. What standard should a court utilize in making such a determination? Statu-
184. CAL. EvID. CODE § 11 17(b)(2).
185. Foxgate, 25 P.3d at 1125 n.8 (emphasis removed).
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Id. at 1124-28.
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tory definitions of "mediation" would include settlement conferences.' 8 8 Judges
conducting settlement conferences fulfill the common dictionary definition of
"mediate."' 189 The Foxgate court's determination that "the judge was acting as a
mediator ' 19° is suspect because that would be true in both a mediation proceeding
and a settlement conference. 191
The scarcity of other differentiating factors is likely to put increased reliance
on the process' label in determining whether a proceeding is a mediation, with all
the rights and protections thereto appertaining, or a settlement conference, with
different rights and protections. Even this criterion might be suspect, depending
on the clarity of the appointing label. For example, in the Foxgate case, the opera-
tive language in the Case Management Order defined the judge's role as "act[ing]
as a mediator for settlement conferences" and "presid[ing] over mediation confer-
ences." 192 The likelihood of courts consistently interpreting this type of ambigu-
ous language is problematic.
The Foxgate decision creates havoc by differentiating between the protections
and powers associated with judicial mediations and settlement conferences, but
then declining to provide guidance on how to differentiate between these proc-
esses. The court justifies its concluding that this was a mediation at least partly on
the basis that, "It seems clear from the record, and the parties appear to agree, that
the proceeding about which Judge Smith reported was a mediation
proceeding .... "193
Finding that the parties agree on this issue, which in Foxgate was raised in an
Amicus brief, will not be of much assistance when the parties frame this as the
issue in controversy for determination in subsequent litigation. Parties are certain
to litigate whether a proceeding was a settlement conference or mediation now
that the law is clear that serious ramifications follow that determination.
That is exactly what happened in Doe I v. Superior Court. 194 The party seek-
ing to divulge information that had been created as part of a judicially supervised
mediation or settlement conference argued that the proceeding was a settlement
188. The California Evidence Code defines mediation as "a process in which a neutral person or
persons facilitate communication between the disputants to assist them in reaching a mutually accept-
able agreement." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1115. The Uniform Mediation Act similarly defines mediation
as, "a process in which a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between parties to assist
them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute." UNIF. MEDIATION ACT §2(1) (2002).
189. MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11 th ed. 2003). "Mediate" is defined as an
adjective meaning "occupying a middle position... " or as a verb meaning "to effect by action as an
intermediary ..... Id. See also Galanter, supra note 2 (where Marc Galanter traces the judicial role in
settlement without differentiating between settlement conferences and mediations).
190. Foxgate, 25 P.3d at 1125 n.8.
191. But see Carrie Menkel-Meadow's opinion that,
Judges who perform these functions [asking questions to explore the parties' interests and at-
tempting to fashion tailor-made solutions from an objective perspective] are not necessarily me-
diators, though they are frequently called that by themselves and others. Strictly speaking, a me-
diator facilitates communication between the parties and helps them to reach their own solution.
As a mediator becomes more directly involved in suggesting the substantive solution, his or her
role can change and he or she can become an arbitrator or adjudicator. It appears that the role
judges and magistrates assume in many settlement conferences is this hybrid form of med-arb.
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 5 10 (internal citations omitted).
192. Foxgate, 25 P.3d at 1125 n.8 (emphasis omitted).
193. Id.
194. 34 Cal.Rptr.3d 248 (Ct. App. 2005).
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conference, and thus exempt from the mediation confidentiality provisions. The
Doe 1 court recognized "the conceptual difficulties in distinguishing between a
mediation and a settlement conference when a bench officer is presiding at those
talks."' 95 This court found that the proceeding was a mediation despite references
to it in the record as both a settlement conference and mediation, because the re-
cord was "replete with numerous other references to an ongoing mediation." The
court concluded its analysis by advising counsel and future appellate courts,
If counsel wish to avoid the effect of mediation confidentiality rules, they
should make clear at the outset that something other than a mediation is
intended. Except where the parties have expressly agreed otherwise, ap-
pellate courts should not seize on an occasional reference to 'settlement'
as a means to frustrate the mediation confidentiality statutes. 196
The advent of judicial mediation further complicates the confusion in the law
regarding judges seeking to settle cases assigned to them for trial, because under
Foxgate, it could be determined that a settlement judge conducted either a settle-
ment conference or a mediation, with different powers and protections dependent
upon that determination.
2. Determining the Legitimacy of Settlement Techniques by the "Label of
Process"
The progeny of the Foxgate precedent and reasoning includes another Cali-
fornia appellate decision regarding whether a settlement judge exceeded his au-
thority. The issue in Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. The Superior Court of L.A.
County197 was whether the settlement judge exceeded his authority by making a
finding that there was probable liability, and then finding the range of likely dam-
ages. 198 The judge made these findings because the defendant's insurers had
threatened the defendant that they would forfeit their insurance coverage if the
defendant settled the case without their consent and prior to determinations of
liability and the amount of that liability. 99
The appellate court acknowledged, "The stipulated order appointing Judge
Lichtman as settlement and mediation judge stated that he could review the prob-
able evidence, offer evaluations of the strength of the evidence, the applicable
law, the amount of damages, and 'take any other steps or apply any other settle-
ment techniques he finds appropriate .... .. 200 Despite this apparent prior agree-
ment among the parties (a stipulated order) to invest the settlement judge with
broad powers, the defendant's insurers asked the appellate court to vacate the
findings by the settlement judge. 20'
195. Id at 252.
196. Id. at 225-53.
197. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Superior Court, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 751 (2005) [hereinafter
Travelers].
198. Id. at 754-57.
199. Id. at 755-57.
200. Id. at 762 n.15.
201. Id. at 756.
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The appellate court found that this was a "type of mediation conducted as part
of voluntary settlement conferences." 20 2 Following the example of Foxgate, the
Travelers court found that Judge Lichtman was conducting a mediation and that
the process "was governed by the rules applicable to mediations, . .. even though
that mediation took place as part of a voluntary settlement process.2 a 3
Upon finding that this proceeding was governed by the rules applicable to
mediations, the Travelers court applied the California Rules of Court for Court
Annexed Mediations (California Rules). 204 The court acknowledged that the Cali-
fornia Rules specifically exempt sitting judges and settlement conferences. 205 The
Travelers Court justified its application of the California Rules to this settlement
judge on the Advisory Committee Comment to California Rule 1620.1(d), which
states:
Although these rules do not apply to them, judicial officers who serve as
mediators in their courts' mediation programs are nevertheless encour-
aged to be familiar with and observe these rules when mediating, particu-
larly the rules concerning subjects not covered in the Code of Judicial
Ethics such as voluntary participation and self-determination.20
6
Because rule 1620.1(e) specifically states, "The rules in this part do not apply
to settlement conferences conducted under rule 222 of the California Rules of
Court," the only way the Travelers court could apply these rules was to find that
the proceeding was a mediation rather than a settlement conference. As in Fox-
gate, the criteria for such a determination are unclear.
20 7
Also similar to Foxgate, the Travelers court appeared to give great weight to
the label of the proceeding. The description of the judge's extensive powers in the
stipulated appointment might have justified a finding that this proceeding was
more similar to a settlement conference than a mediation. The Travelers court
confirms the confusion when it finds that this is "the type of mediation conducted
as part of voluntary settlement conferences."
20 8
The Travelers court found that "[a] mediator must conduct the mediation in a
manner that supports the principles of voluntary participation and self-
202. Id. at 757-58, 758 n.8.
203. Id. at 758 n.8.
204. Id. at 758.
205. Id. at 758. CAL. CT. R. 1620.1 (d) and (e) provide:
(d) The rules in this part do not apply to judges or other judicial officers while they are serving in
a capacity in which they are governed by the Code of Judicial Ethics.
(e) The rules in this part do not apply to settlement conferences conducted under rule 222 of the
California Rules of Court.
CAL. CT. R. 1620.1 (d)-(e). These California rules apparently exempt judges because judges' ethical
boundaries are articulated in the Code of Judicial Ethics. Id.
206. Travelers, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 758; CAL. CT. R. 1620.1(d).
207. The Travelers court could be attributed the proposition that settlement proceedings conducted by
the trial judge cannot be "mediations" on the ground of its statement that "[A] mediator should not
have the authority to resolve or decide the mediated dispute and should not have any function for the
adjudicating tribunal with regard to the dispute, except as a non-decision making neutral." Travelers,
24 Cal.Rptr.3d at 758 (citations omitted). While this court specifically refuses to articulate the differ-
ence between a settlement conference and a mediation, a possible criterion that it appears to support is
whether the judge will make later rulings on the case. See id.
208. Id. at 757, 758 n.8.
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determination by the parties. 20 9 It explained that neither the Judge's inherent
authority nor the broad grant of authority in the stipulated order appointing him as
settlement judge could allow the settlement judge "to exceed the neutral, non-
factfinding role of a mediator. 2 1 0 The court vacated the findings of the settlement
judge on the grounds that the judge "exceeded his authority by making factual
findings and otherwise preparing a coercive order in violation of the fundamental
principles governing mediation proceedings."
21
'
The Travelers court clearly followed Foxgate's lead when it "expressly de-
cline[d] to consider or clarify any differences that might exist between a mediation
and voluntary settlement conference." The court wrote, "Therefore, our decision
should not be construed as holding that all voluntary settlement conferences are
mediations which are subject to the rules concerning the conduct of mediation
proceedings. Instead, we apply the various mediation rules [in this case] because
that order was the result of a mediation.
' 212
As in Foxgate, then, the propriety of the judge's conduct might be dramati-
cally different if the proceeding was a settlement conference instead of a media-
tion. Travelers requires judicial mediations to conform to at least the principles of
voluntary participation and self-determination articulated in the California
Rules. 13 Settlement conferences are specifically exempted from such standards
by the California Rules and by the Travelers decision. The primary distinction
between the processes appears to be the label utilized for the proceedings.
The advent of judicial mediation creates confusion in the law because the
powers and boundaries of judicial mediation are different from those in a settle-
ment conference, and it is challenging to differentiate between the processes.
California law appears to depend heavily on how the process is labeled.
3. Questioning the "Label of the Process" Approach with Empirical Data
Is California's reliance on the label of the process when determining confi-
dentiality and standards of practice based on an assumption that the content and
techniques in mediations are distinct from those of settlement conferences? If the
processes are distinct, do those differences ameliorate or exasperate the concerns
about judges conducting mediations? For example, it could be argued that the
concern about pre-judging the case is absent if mediations consist of an interest-
based, problem-solving approach instead of a bargaining-in-the-shadow-of-the-
209. Id. at 758. According to the California Rules of Court, voluntary participation and self-
determination require the mediator to:
(a) Inform the parties, at or before the outset of the first mediation session, that any resolution
dispute in mediation requires a voluntary agreement of parties;
(b) Respect the right of each participant to decide the extent of his or her participation in the me-
diation, including the right to withdraw from the mediation at any time; and
(c) Refrain from coercing any party to make a decision or to continue to participate in the media-
tion.
CAL. CT. R. 1620.3.
210. Travelers, 24 Cat.Rptr.3d at 761.
211. Id. at 754.
212. Id. at 758 n.8.
213. Id. at 757-58.
214. CAL. CT. R. 1620.1(d)-(e); Travelers, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d at 757-58.
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law approach. Likewise, there might be less concern about coercion if mediations
are dramatically more facilitative than settlement conferences.
While the California courts might continue distinguishing between the powers
and protections in judicial mediation compared to settlement conferences based on
the label of the process, they might be persuaded to pursue a more substantive
approach by empirical data showing that the processes are substantially the same.
Toward that end, the survey of California judges 215 sought to document the con-
tent and technique of judicial mediations and settlement conferences.
As described above,216 the survey of California judges asked those judges
who had not had a family or civil assignment in the last four years to only answer
questions about their attitudes, and nothing else. The objective of the survey was
to quantify judicial attitudes of all judges, but only the practices of current civil
and family law judges ("current" being defined as within the last four years).
Eighty-five judges without civil or family assignments revealed their attitudes
towards judicial mediation and settlement conferences, and then followed direc-
tions to not answer any further questions. Thus the demographics for the judges
who completed the rest of the survey are: 72 family law judges, 129 general civil
judges, 22 limited jurisdiction judges, 6 complex civil judges, and 10 judges who
reported having assignments in more than one category. The judges with assign-
ments in more than one category were not counted in any of the designated cate-
gories, but were included in the category of all judges.
Rather than imposing definitions on the judges, the survey accepted the labels
used by judges to differentiate between the processes. Whenever a judge used the
label of mediation for the settlement proceeding, then it was considered a media-
tion; likewise for settlement conferences.2 7 Rather than focusing on definitions to
label the processes, the survey deferred to the judges regarding labels and focused
on the content of the proceedings. The result is documentation of the conduct and
techniques judges used when they conducted processes they label "settlement
conferences" and separate documentation of the conduct and techniques when
judges label the proceeding "mediation."
The methodology used to document the judges' conduct and techniques was
to ask each judge to provide an estimate of how often he used a specific technique
in meetings he labeled, "settlement conferences," and a separate estimate how
often he used the same technique for meetings he labeled, "mediations." The
survey identified thirty-two techniques 21 8 and asks each judge to indicate whether
that technique was used less than 10%, between 10% and 40%, between 41% and
60%, between 61% and 90%, or more than 90% of the time. The techniques que-
ried were largely drawn from the characteristics identified in Professor Leonard
Riskin's grid on mediator style.21 9
215. See supra Part I.B, III.C and accompanying notes.
216. See supra Part ll.B and accompanying notes.
217. See supra Part Ill.C and accompanying notes. This seems especially appropriate because of the
times when the label of the process seems to have legal significance.
218. See infra app. A.
219. For a background in Riskin's Grid theory, see Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators'
Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 7, 25
(1996); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin's Grid, 3
HARv. NEG. L. REv. 71 (1998); Leonard L. Riskin, Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid
and the New New Grid System, 79 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (2003).
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The structure of the survey allows for comparison of the content of how a
judge conducts each process. Unfortunately, only 40 judges acknowledged ever
conducting processes they labeled mediations. Of that number, comparing the
difference in how the same judge conducts a mediation and a settlement confer-
ence is impossible for three judges because they reported never conducting set-
tlement conferences. Out of this group of 37 judges conducting both processes,
only 27 completed the questions about their utilization frequencies of the thirty-
two techniques once for settlement conferences and another time for mediations.
Despite the extremely limited sample, it is interesting to examine the degree of
similarity or difference for how each of these 27 judges conducts both processes.
Specifically, the data allows the examination of how each judge's thirty-two
measurements for settlement conferences compares with the thirty-two measure-
ments for that same judge conducting mediations.
The first measure of the degree of similarity in technique between how the
same judge conducts the two processes is the number of incidents in which the
thirty-two techniques for that judge were different. The following table reveals
the number of judges reporting the corresponding number of incidences in which
the frequency of technique varied between the processes:
Frequency of Variation in Techniques Used in Mediations versus Settlement Con-
ferences
Number of techniques (out of 32) used Number of judges reporting that num-

















Thus, the data shows that out of the judges that reported conducting both
processes (37) and that also reported the content of how they conduct both proc-
esses (27), only 9 report a substantially different content between the processes.
Of the 27 judges, more than one-fourth (7 judges) report no differences, and two-
thirds (18 judges) report variations in the utilization frequency of five or fewer out
of thirty-two techniques. One-third (9 judges) report differences in frequencies
for nine or more of the techniques, with only 4 judges reporting differences in
frequencies for more than sixteen techniques.
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The aggregate picture is that out of 864 measures (32 measures for each of 27
judges) there were a total of 174 reported variations between the processes.
Eighty percent of the measures showed that techniques were used with the same
frequency in a "mediation" as in a "settlement conference."
A second measure of the degree of difference between the content of these
processes is the extent of variation in the frequency of utilization. For example,
Judge A reports that he expresses his opinion on the likely outcome of the case at
trial between 61% and 90% of the time in settlement conferences, but a different
frequency in mediations; the amount of difference between the processes is
greater if he reports that he uses this same technique in less than 10% of his me-
diations compared to between 41% and 60% of his mediations.
The above data identifies a total of 174 variations between the frequencies of
utilization of a technique by the same judge in a settlement conference compared
to a mediation. Of those 174 variations, 106 were one category different, 47
were two categories different, 16 were three categories different, and 5 were four
categories different. This data reveals that of the 20% of all measures that showed
a variation (174 out of 864), 60% (106 out of 174) were different by only one
category. Thus, there were only 68221 out of the total 864 measures that were
more dramatically different. The data shows a difference in frequency of two or
more categories for only 7.9% of the measures.
The final aspect of this data that may be instructive is whether there is a trend
in which of the techniques were different between the two processes. For exam-
ple, it might be important if each of the 20 judges reporting variations in the proc-
esses 222 reported differences on the same technique.
The following table describes the number of judges (out of 20) who reported
variations in use of a particular technique between processes labeled "mediations"
and "settlement conferences." "Mediations over settlement conferences" is used
to describe when a judge uses the technique in mediation more than in settlement
conferences. Conversely, "Settlement conferences over mediations" is used to
describe when a judge uses the technique in settlement conferences more than in
mediation.
220. The categories referred to are the categories of frequency available to the judges: less than 10%,
10 to 40%, 41 to 60%, 61 to 90%, and more than 90%. One category different would represent a level
of frequency immediately greater or lesser than that being compared. Two categories different would
be a level of frequency two categories greater or lesser than that being compared, ie 61 to 90% would
be two categories different than 10 to 40%. Three categories different would be a level of frequency
two categories removed from that being compared, i.e. more than 90% and 10 to 40%. The only way
to have four categories different is the two extreme categories, less than 10% and more than 90%.
221. From above, 47 + 16 + 5 = 68
222. Twenty-seven judges reported data, but 7 reported no differences.
No. 21
41
Robinson: Robinson: Adding Judicial Mediation
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2006
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION




u 0 0 0
"I express my opinions on the likely outcome of the case at 11 0 11
trial"
"I focus primarily on satisfying the parties' underlying 10 10 0
needs, goals, fears, or feelings"
"I encourage the parties to express their emotions" 10 10 0
"I give advice that addresses the underlying needs, goals, 8 7 1
fears and feelings arising out of the dispute, e.g., that set-
tling a lawsuit is not abandoning the memory of a loved
one"
"I focus primarily on explaining to the parties the legal 8 1 7
strengths and weaknesses of the case"
"I encourage the parties to generate creative solutions that 8 7 1
would address the underlying needs, goals, fears, and feel-
ings arising out of the dispute"
"I urge the parties to accept a particular settlement pro- 8 2 6
posal"
"I use conditional or hypothetical offers to assist in bridg- 7 1 6
ing the difference between offers and demands"
"I suggest my ideas for creative solutions that would ad- 7 5 2
dress the underlying needs, goals, fears and feelings arising
out of the dispute"
"I use bracketing techniques [have both sides make a con- 6 0 6
fidential offer to me in an attempt to get within a desig-
nated range] to assist in bridging the difference between
offers and demands"
"I tell the attorneys and parties what I think they should do" 6 1 5
"I emphasize the finality of settlement compared to the 6 2 4
possibility of appeals and challenges of enforcing a judg-
ment"
"I help the parties understand each other's underlying 6 4 2
needs, goals, fears, and feelings"
"I emphasize that I only have limited time for this settle- 6 3 3
ment meeting"
"I am very influential helping the parties determine the 6 3 3
terms of a settlement"
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"I ask the parties (rather than the lawyers) to discuss the 5 5 0
case directly with me"
"I request concessions from one or more parties in the ne- 5 1 4
gotiation"
"I emphasize the non-financial costs (including but not 5 4 1
limited to emotional, relational, and opportunity) of con-
tinuing the litigation"
"I provide the parties with a 'net to client' analysis compar- 5 1 4
ing the amounts received by the client after fees and costs
from a settlement offer to that from a likely judgment after
trial"
"I express my opinion of the parties' needs, goals, fears, 5 4 1
and feelings"
"I emphasize the financial costs of continuing the litiga- 5 2 3
tion"
"I discuss confidentiality of the settlement discussions with 4 4 0
the participants"
"I explain to the parties that they are signaling their degree 4 1 3
of flexibility in the negotiation by the size of each conces-
sion and the amount of time between concessions"
"I am indifferent as to whether a settlement is accom- 4 2 2
plished"
"I meet exclusively in private meetings with individual 4 2 2
party(ies) -'caucuses'
"I show empathy and understanding of the parties' con- 3 3 0
cerns through active listening techniques"
"I emphasize the risks of trying the case compared to the 3 0 3
certainty of settling"
"I ask the parties (rather than lawyers) to discuss the case 3 2 1
directly with the other side"
"I attempt to be strict or intimidating" 2 0 2
"I ask the attorneys and parties what they think they should 2 2 0
do"
"I attempt to be congenial or likable" 2 1 1
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Few will be surprised by the trends in the differences between judicial media-
tions and settlement conferences revealed by this data. Judicial mediations en-
courage parties to express their emotions more and are more about satisfying the
parties' underlying needs, goals, fears, and feelings. In contrast, settlement con-
ferences are more about the judge explaining her opinion of the legal strengths
and weaknesses of the case and her opinion on the likely outcome of the case at
trial.
But these differences are only a matter of slight degrees because differences
were only reported in 174 out of 864 measures and the difference in frequency
was only one category 80% of the time. The 68 measures showing a difference of
more than one category were distributed among the techniques. In many in-
stances, some of the judges reported using a particular technique more often in
mediation, while other judges reported using the same technique more often in
settlement conferences.
The fact that 7 of 27 judges reported no differences, the limited number of
differences for many judges, and the large number of differences that were only
one degree different supports the conclusion that often, when measured by com-
paring the techniques of judges who use both labels, the content of a mediation is
substantially the same as the content of a settlement conference. The conclusion
is qualified because of the limited sample and data.
C. The Uniform Mediation Act Uses "Subsequent Decision Making" to
Determine Mediation Confidentiality
The most prominent and processed mediation confidentiality statute is the
Uniform Mediation Act (UMA),223 recommended for enactment in all states by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 2001.2
Regarding the issue of judges mediating cases assigned to them for trial, the UMA
specifies, "The [Act] does not apply to a mediation.., conducted by a judge who
might make a ruling on the case."
225
The Comments to this section of the UMA explain that "this Section excludes
certain judicially conducted mediations from [the confidentiality provided by] the
Act., 226 The comments distinguish between "judicially-hosted settlement confer-
ences that for all practical purposes are mediation sessions for which the Act's
policies of promoting full and frank discussions between the parties would be
furthered," and case management judicial conferences that could lead to court
orders entered into the public record on issues like discovery in which "the parties
hardly have an expectation of confidentiality., 227
Rather than maintaining this distinction, the proposed statutory language "ex-
cludes those settlement conferences in which information from the mediation is
communicated to a judge with responsibility for the case." 228 Conversely, it ex-
223. UNmF. MEDIATION ACT (2001), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/uma2001.pdf.
224. Id. at PREFATORY NOTE PART 3.
225. § 3(b)(3).





Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2006, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2006/iss2/1
Adding Judicial Mediation to the Debate
tends confidentiality protection to "mediations conducted by judges specifically
and exclusively . . . assigned to mediate cases, so-called 'buddy judges' ... be-
cause such mediators do not make later rulings on the case.
229
Note that the UMA chooses to not try to differentiate between a settlement
conference and a judicial mediation. The language in the comment cited above
lumps both processes together by referring to "settlement conferences in which
information from the mediation ... .,230
Instead, the UMA uses the issue of whether trial judges should conduct set-
tlement conferences/mediations for cases assigned to them for trial as the fulcrum
point to determine confidentiality. 231 The standards reflected in the comments
about promoting full and frank discussions between the parties and whether the
parties have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality 232 were transformed into
whether the judge might make a ruling on the case. When addressing judges fa-
cilitating settlement, the UMA could have distinguished between settlement dis-
cussions and other case management discussions. Instead, the proposed statute
denies protection for all discussions with a judge who "might make a ruling on the
case.
233
The UMA's standard of whether the judge "might make a ruling on the case"
does offer the clarity of a bright line test, as suggested by Professor Alfini.234 The
problem is that denying confidentiality protection to judicially supervised settle-
ment discussions for cases assigned to that judge for trial creates confusion in the
law. Adopting the standard of whether "a judge might make a ruling on the case"
to determine confidentiality doesn't forbid the practice of trial judges facilitating
settlement for their cases. It simply requires other authority for the customary
confidentiality protections for such proceedings.
Most jurisdictions have other sources of authority for maintaining the confi-
dentiality of a settlement conference. 23  While the UMA declines to distinguish
between settlement conferences and mediations, some state laws may make dis-
236tinctions. The advent of judicial mediation creates additional havoc in the law
because if a judge labels the proceeding a "mediation," the discussions might not
be protected by the UMA (because the judge "might make a decision in the case")




232. Id. "On the other hand, there are judicially-hosted settlement conferences that for all practical
purposes are mediation sessions for which the Act's policies of promoting full and frank discussions
between the parties would be furthered." Id. The California Court Rules are more formal when dis-
cussing goals: "These rules are intended to guide the conduct of mediators in these programs, to inform
and protect participants in these mediation programs, and to promote public confidence in the media-
tion process and the courts." CAL. CT. R. 1620(a). Part of that confidence is, likely, confidentiality.
See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 8; CAL. CT. R. 1624.
233. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 3(B)(3). It is especially interesting that the UMA does not appear to
distinguish between a bench and jury trial. Since a judge in a jury trial makes evidentiary and other
rulings, the UMA confidentiality protections would not extend to settlement proceedings supervised by
the trial judge.
234. Alfini, supra note 106, at 14.
235. See, e.g., CAL. CT. R. 3(f)(4). "All settlement conference proceedings shall be confidential." Id.
(CA ORDER 06-123).
236. See supra Part V.B.i. (discussing California law).
No. 2]
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settlement conferences, because the proceeding is a "mediation" rather than a
"settlement conference". It would almost certainly surprise most lawyers and
clients to learn that comments in such a judicial mediation could be admissible at
trial.
The UMA's approach of focusing on whether the judge might make a ruling
on the case is in stark contrast to the focus in California law on the status of the
judge and label of the process as determinative of the judge's authority and appli-
cability of statutory confidentiality protections. The current law in California
focuses on distinguishing between settlement conferences, with certain attached
rights, and mediation, with other attached rights.237 Notice that whether the judge
will make a ruling on the case is irrelevant. If a judge labels a settlement proceed-
ing a settlement conference, the mediation confidentiality protections would not
apply, but other court rules protect those communications. 238 If a judge labels the
settlement proceeding a mediation, the statute's confidentiality protections would
appear to apply, even if the case was assigned to her for trial.
VI. How JUDICIAL MEDIATION COULD ASSIST IN RESOLVING THE
CONTROVERSY AND CLARIFYING THE LAW
The mediation movement is creating standards of practice and ethics for me-
diators. The advent of judicial mediation could assist in resolving the controversy
about trial judges seeking to settle their own cases by using the standards for me-
diators as a basis to articulate ethical standards for settlement judges. The applica-
tion of standards for self-determination and voluntary participation in the Travel-
ers case was confusing only because the law exempts settlement conferences from
such standards. The advent of judicial mediation could become the catalyst for
clarifying ethical practices for any judge acting in any settlement capacity.
Professors Alfini and Floyd identified the need for such standards a decade
ago. 2 39 The continued refinement in mediator ethical standards like the California
Rules of Conduct for Mediators in Court-Connected Mediation Programs for Civil
Cases 24° and the revised Standards of Practice jointly developed and adopted by
the American Bar Association, the American Arbitration Association, and the
Association for Conflict Resolution 241 provide increasingly refined guidelines for
appropriate practices in the settlement support capacity. These standards should
not be adopted and applied to judges en masse because perhaps there should be
some unique characteristics when a judge, especially the trial judge, is the media-
tor. But the continued maturation of such standards for the private sector clarifies
the thinking and provides the foundation for such standards for sitting judges.
Creating explicit ethical standards for judges advancing settlement would be a
vast improvement over the calls that trial judges should not mediate or conduct
settlement conferences for their own cases, or that the rights and responsibilities
237. Id.
238. CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 1115-28 (2004).
239. Alfini, supra note 106, at 14; Hurst Floyd, supra note 166, at 90.
240. CAL. CT. R. §§ 1620-22.3.
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for judges conducting settlement conferences should be different from those of
judges conducting mediations.
VII. CONCLUSION
The advent of judicial mediation may provide an opportunity to resolve a
decades-old controversy about judges attempting to settle cases assigned to them
for trial. While it is uncontested that settlement has become a much more signifi-
cant function for most modem day judges, judicial ethics have not yet evolved to
provide clear ethical standards for judges attempting to assist in settling. While
some propose a bright line test that would forbid judges from attempting to settle
any case in which they might make a decision, such an approach would be con-
trary to prevailing practice and would eliminate the opportunity for judicial signal-
ing to assist parties in their settlement strategies. Rather than arbitrarily differen-
tiating between settlement conferences and mediations, this author suggests ac-
knowledging that the content and techniques of the processes are virtually identi-
cal.
Once the processes are viewed as virtually identical, the judicial ethics com-
munity can build on the continuing refinement of standards of practice for media-
tors to develop specialized ethics for judges attempting to assist in settling cases.
Clarifying that judges can assist in settling cases assigned to them for trial and the
ethical standards when doing so would empower judges and judicial administra-
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APPENDIX A
JUDICL4L VIEWW AND PRACTICES REGARDING JUDGESA77EMPTING
TO SETTLE CDIL OR FAMILYLAW PCASES
As a judge, you are in a unique position to help us document judicial views and practices regarding judges who
attempt to settle civil or family law cases. For this reason, we are asking you to fill out this survey, which should take
about 10 to 15 minutes of your time. If you decide to participate, your experiences and views will be included in reports
that are attempting to identify norms in this important part of judicial practice. Your participation is completely voluntary.
You are free not to answer any of the questions for any reason.
This project assures the anonymity of your responses. The survey does not identify you in any way, and you are
asked to return the surveys in a pre-addressed envelope. The surveys will be mailed to a P.O. Box belonging to a law
school professor who is partnering with CJER and the AOC on this project This way, even the professor will not know
which judges have responded. CJER and the AOC will only be given access to the aggregate compilation of the data. The
professor and his/her research team will use the data to write articles for publication. You can choose to receive the
composite summary of your peers' responses by returning the blue postcard, even if you choose to not complete the survey.
This survey seeks data about current views and practices of judges.
Please answer all questions about your practice over the last four years. 6% ,
1. With the consent of the parties, I believe that civil or family law judges; % be
a. shouldbeallowedtomediateasmsassignedtothemfortrial; 1 2 3 4 5
b. should be allowed to conduct settlement conferences for cases assigned 1 2 3 4 5
to them for trial.
2. In the past four years, which type of cases below have you had the most experience in conducting settlement
conferences or mediations? (Please check one)
0 Family Law
C0 General Civil
o Limited Jurisdiction Civil
a Complex Civil
0 I have not conducted mediations or settlement conferences in any of the above types of cases in the past four years.
(If none, please stop here and moal back the survey.)
Please answer the remaining questions in this survey based on the type of ease In which you indicated you have the
most experience n the last four years.
3. When I schedule meetings to try to help settle a case:
a. I label those meetings settlement conferencer % of the time; and
b. I label those meetings mediationr % ofthe time. (The two answers should total 100%)
Questions 4-15 asks you about the practices you have typically followed in the mediations and settlement conferences you
have done during the last four years. Please use the response column on the left side of the page to describe your practice
when presiding over meetings you labeled as mediations. Please use the response columa on the right side of the page to
describe your practice when presiding over meetings you labeled as settlement conferences.
If you have presided over BOTH mediations and settlement conferences, please complete the separate response columns for
each process. If you have only presided over one process (mediations OR settlement conferences), you only need to
complete the appropriate response column for that process
Mediations Settlement Conferences
days afer filing _ or 4. Imost typically schedule the settlement meetings: - days after filing, or
days before trial (use 0, ifit is the day oftrial ) days before trial
minutes - 5. My settlement meetings most typically last about: __ minutes
6. The nunber ofscttlemet meetings I conduct a week is about _
7. The percentage of my setlement meetings that are for cases in
% which I am assigned as the trial judge is about: __%
% 8. The percentage of cases that settle at my settlement meetings is about _ %
48
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2006, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2006/iss2/1
Adding Judicial Mediation to the Debate
9. Based on your typical practice in the mediations and settlement conferences
you have conducted in the last four years, please provide your best estimate of
the percentage of sediations and settlement conferences in which the following
statements apply:
Mediations
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5




a. I focus primarily on explaining to the parties the legal strengths
and weaknesses of the case;
b. I express my opinions on the likely outcome of the case at triaLt
c. I request concessions from one or more parties in the negotiation;
d. I explain to the parties that they are signaling their degree of
flexibility in the negotiation by the size of each concession
and the amount of tite between concessions;
e. I use conditional or hypothetical offem to assist in bridging the
difference between offers and demands;
f I use bracketing techniques [have both sides make a confidential
offer to me in an attempt to get within a designated range] to
assist in bridging the difference between offers and demands;
4 5 g. I emphasize the risks of trying the case compared to the certainty of settling;
4 5 h. I emphasize the financial costs of continuing the litigation
4 5 i. I emphasize the non-financial costs (including but not linited to
emotional, relational, and opportunity) of contiming the litigation;
4 5 j. I provide the parties with a "net to client" analysis comparing the
amounts received by the client after fees and costs from a settlemenn
offer to that from a likely judgment after trial;
4 5 k. I emphasize that I only have limited time for this settlement meeting;
4 5 1. lam very influential helping parties determine the term of a settlement;
4 5 m. I urge the parties to accept a particular settlement proposal;
4 5 I I am indifferent asto whether a settlement is accomplished
4 5 o. I show empathy and understanding of the parties' concerns through
active listening techniques;
4 5 p. I encourage the parties to express their emotions;
4 5 q. I focus primarily on satisfying the parties' Mderlying needs, goals,
fears, or feelings;
4 5 r. I express my opinion of the parties' needs, goals, fears, and feelings;
4 5 s. I help the parties understand each other's undrling needs, goals,
fears, and feelings;
4 5 t. I encourage the parties to generate creative solutions that would
address the underlying needs, goals fears, and feelings arising
out of the dispute;
4 5 u. I suggest my ideas for creative solutiom that would address the
underlying needs, gols, fears, and feelings arising out of the dispute;
4 5 v. I give advice that addresses the underlying needs, goals, fears
and feelings arising out of the dispute, e.g., that settling a lawsuit
is not abandoning the memory of a loved one;
4 5 w. I emphasize the finality of settlement compared to the possibility of
appeals and challenges of enforciag ajudgement;
4 5 x. I tell the attorneys and parties what I think they should do;
4 5 y. I ask the attorneys and parties what they think they should do;






1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
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1 2 3 4 5 aa. I attempt to be strict or intiidating; 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 bb. I meet exclusively in private meetings with individual party(ies) - "caucuses" 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 cc. l ask the parties (rather than lawyers) to discuss the case directly 1 2 3 4 5
with the other side;
1 2 3 4 5 dd. t ask the parties (rather than lawyers) to discuss the case directly with me; 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 ee. I discuss confidentiality ofthe settlement discussions with the participant; 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 ff. I treat the lawyers'and parties' settlement commnmications as confidential. 1 2 3 4 5
10. If a case has been assigned to you for trial, do you use different practices/techniques in conducting mediations or
settlement conferences than if the case is not assigned to you for trial? YES NO (circle one)
If yes, please describe how the practices/techniques that you ue differ.
For questions 11-15, based on your practice for cases assined to yu for trial please provide your best estimate of the
percentage of mediations or settlement conferences in which the following statements apply.
Settlement
Mediations Conferences
11. To the extent that I appraise or recommett terms of settlement I base my
appraisal or recommendation on:
1 2 3 4 5 a. documents, testimony, or other evidence that would be admissible at trial; 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 b. statements from parties not under oath- 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 c. attimeysunmariesofevidece; 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 d. confidential information that has not been disclosed to the other party(s); 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 e. what I believe will be acceptable to all parties. 1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5 12. IfIhaverevealedmyappraisalofthevalueofthecaseinsetlement
discussions and the case does not settle, I am concerned about the parties'
perceptions of my nutrality.
13. If a case does not settle, my later substantive decisions are affected by
the in.-mation I learned in settlement discussions because I am
1 2 3 4 5 a. impacted by inadmissible or confidential infornation;
1 2 3 4 5 b. wanting to validate my prediction ofthe value ofthe case;
1 2 3 4 5 c. resenting the party who was unreasomble and caused the impasse.
14. To the extent that I encourage parties to settle, my motivations are that:
1 2 3 4 5 a. I like the sense ofaccomplishment from being able to settle difficult cases;
1 2 3 4 5 b. I don't want the time I invest in settlement discussions to be wasted;
1 2 3 4 5 c. Irelyonsettlementstomanageabusydocket;
1 2 3 4 5 .Il think settlement is in the best interests ofboth (or all) parties.
15.1 encourage settlements by:
1 2 3 4 5 a. expediting ruling on a motion;
1 2 3 4 5 b. delaying ruling on a motion;
1 2 3 4 5 c. acheduling additional settlement discussions ifthe case does not settle;
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16. The average number ofcivil or family cases that are/were assigned to me per year is about _.
17. The county or district whee I serve is organized so that when a case is assigned to me for trial the omal practice is:
(Circle one)
a. I am the otly judge available to conduct settlement conferences or mediations for that case;
b. I am welcome to conduct settlement conferences or mediations, but other judges are available for settlement
conferences or mediations for that case; or
c. I am discouraged from conducting settlement conferences or mediations for that case.
18. When I conduct settlement discussions in a civil or family law case and believe that the emerging settlement
substantially deviates from what I believe would be the normal range of outcomes at trial, I use the following responses
with the designated frequency: (Answer on the left margin colun assuming parties are represented by counsel and on the
right margin assuming that the party(ies) getting the bad deal is not represented by counsel.)
S~U 1.4 'b
Represented Represented
1 2 3 4 5 a. refrain from saying anything that implies my personal view of the 1 2 3 4 5
settlement tenon;




to assist in reaching a solution agreeable to the parties, even if it is substantially
different hom what I believe would be within the normal range of trial outcomes;
c. ask questions to ascertain if the parties are entering the agreement freely and
willingly and that there is no fraud, undue influence, or duress;
d. ask questions to ascertain if the parties are aware of their legal rights, bet
are knowingly and purposefully choosing to not exercise those rights;
e. make statements acknowledging my limited information about the case, but
inform the parties of my general perspective of the parties' legal rights and of
the normal range ofjury verdicts for cases like theirs;
f. inform the parties of the normal range of jury verdicts for cases like theirs,
bin ff I mtt serious resistance, do nothing;
g. inform the parties of the normal range ofjmy verdicts for cases like theirs,
but ff I meet serins resistance, recuse myself as settlement judge;
K recise myself as the settlement judge explaining that in my opinion the
negotiations were producing an unbalanced outcome;
L recue myself as settlement judge without explanation.
12 345
19. 1 have received the following traing and education regarding settlement techniques: (Circle all that apply)
a. informal coachingby other judges for _ hours;
b. a DRPA or other community mediation training program for _ hours
c. the five day Mediation Skills for Judges program presented by Pepperdime's Stsaus Institute in affiliation with
CJ'ER or Pepperdine's Stram Institute six day Mediating the Litigated Case program
d. JAMS or AAA trainings for hours;
e. Other please describe the source and length of the progam:
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